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1. Merriam-Webster.com reported a 495,000 percent increase in searches for 
this French phrase, meaning “for lack of something better,” on June 27, 
2016. Faute de mieux, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/news-trend-watch/faute-de-mieux-2016-06-27 
[https://perma.cc/GLP7-4CWJ] (last visited Jan. 22, 2019). That 
morning, the Supreme Court announced its 5-3 decision in Whole 
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). In her concurring 
opinion, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg used the phrase in reference to the 
desperate and risky measures that women resort to when restrictions that 
limit access to safe and legal abortion present them with no other options. 
Id. at 2321. 
 Although this Note focuses on Justice Breyer’s majority opinion, it is 
worth noting that Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence, in and of itself, seems 
to acknowledge the compromises and ambiguities of the majority opinion. 
Perhaps in anticipation of attempts to find ways around the decision, her 
concurrence supplements the majority’s analysis with strong statements 
regarding the safety of abortion, supported by the findings of numerous 
studies, and rejects the idea that Targeted Regulation of Abortion 
Providers (“TRAP”) laws could ever pass constitutional muster under the 
undue-burden standard. See id. at 2320–21. 
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Introduction 
Already a mother of two, Valerie Peterson wanted another child 
but had been “told [for years that she] couldn’t have any more 
children.”2 Then, in 2015, Peterson received some shocking news: she 
was pregnant. Unfortunately, her happiness turned to devastation when 
her sixteen-week sonogram revealed that the fetus’s brain and spinal 
cord had not developed properly. Peterson decided to terminate her 
pregnancy, rather than wait to miscarry or deliver a stillborn fetus.3 
However, after the Texas legislature passed numerous onerous abortion 
regulations in 2013 through House Bill 2 (“H.B. 2”),4 more than half of 
the state’s abortion clinics were forced to close, and Peterson’s doctor 
struggled to find her a timely appointment at a nearby facility.5 As a 
result, Peterson decided to travel to Florida, a state with less restrictive 
abortion laws, where she was able to promptly receive the care she 
needed. The combined cost of the procedure and the trip was “close to 
$5,000,” a price that Peterson realized many women could not afford.6 
                                                                
2. Valerie Peterson, How Did I Get an Abortion in Texas? I Didn’t., N.Y. 
Times (June 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/15/opinion/ 
how-did-i-get-an-abortion-in-texas-i-didnt.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/ 
QU94-3RJ3]. 
3. Peterson, supra note 2.  
4. H.B. 2, 83rd Leg., 2d Called Sess. (Tex. 2013). 
5. Peterson, supra note 2. 
6. Id. 
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Less than a year later, the Supreme Court struck down two of H.B. 
2’s provisions in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt,7 after finding 
that “neither . . . confers medical benefits sufficient to justify the 
burdens upon [abortion] access that each imposes.”8 The “admitting-
privileges requirement,” which had forced the closure of nineteen of the 
state’s forty-one clinics,9 required “[a] physician performing or inducing 
an abortion . . . [to], on the date the abortion is performed or induced, 
have active admitting privileges at a hospital that . . . is located not 
further than 30 miles from the location at which the abortion is 
performed or induced.”10 The “surgical-center requirement,” which 
threatened to close fourteen to fifteen more clinics if allowed to go into 
effect,11 required abortion clinics to meet “the minimum standards 
adopted under [the Texas Health and Safety Code] for ambulatory 
surgical centers.”12 After carefully analyzing relevant data and studies 
and weighing the restrictions’ benefits and burdens, the Court held that 
both provisions unconstitutionally imposed an undue burden on the 
right to abortion.13 
Reproductive rights advocates celebrated the victory, and many 
deemed the majority’s careful consideration of public health and 
medical evidence a “win” for “science.”14 Some commentators have even 
                                                                
7. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). 
8. Id. at 2300 (striking down Texas’s admitting-privileges requirement and 
surgical-center requirement). 
9. Daniel Grossman et al., Change in Abortion Services After 
Implementation of a Restrictive Law in Texas, 90 Contraception 496, 
498 (2014); see also Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2312. After 
H.B. 2 was enacted but before any of its provisions went into effect, 
“[e]ight clinics closed or stopped providing abortions.” On the day that 
the first three provisions went into effect, “11 [more] clinics closed or 
stopped providing abortions, leaving 22 open facilities.” Grossman et al., 
supra, at 498. The Whole Woman’s Health majority accepted the district 
court’s factual finding that the admitting-privileges provision caused these 
closures, based on “direct testimony as well as plausible inferences to be 
drawn from the timing of the clinic closures.” 136 S. Ct. at 2313. 
10. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2300 (quoting Tex. Health & 
Safety Code Ann. § 171.0031(a) (West 2015)). 
11. Id. at 2316 (noting that the parties stipulated to these numbers). 
12. Id. at 2300 (quoting Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 245.010(a)). 
13. Id. at 2311–13, 2318. 
14. See, e.g., Alex DiBranco, Whole Woman’s Health’s Unexpected Win for 
Science, The Public Eye, Fall 2016, at 17, http://www.politicalresearch. 
org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/PE_Fall16_DiBranco.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/Y59J-FGQD]; Bixby Center for Global Reproductive Health, 
A Victory for the Role of Evidence in Reproductive Health Care, 
https://bixbycenter.ucsf.edu/news/victory-role-evidence-reproductive-
health-care [https://perma.cc/F3LA-TQYR] (last visited Dec. 13, 2018); 
see also Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, The Difference a Whole 
Woman Makes: Protection for the Abortion Right After Whole Woman’s 
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suggested that this decision will greatly limit states’ ability to restrict 
abortion access without the support of scientific or other empirical 
evidence going forward.15 Others hailed Justice Breyer’s majority 
opinion for breathing life back into the standard of review applied to 
abortion restrictions, which had seemingly devolved into little more 
than rational-basis review.16 
Despite this high praise, many questions remain about the impact 
the Whole Woman’s Health decision will ultimately have on future 
challenges to anti-abortion laws, including those purportedly enacted in 
the interest of protecting women’s17 health (“woman-protective 
abortion restrictions”),18 and those that purport to advance the 
government’s interest in protecting fetal life (“fetal-protective 
restrictions”).19 While recognizing the aspects of the decision that 
                                                                
Health, 126 Yale L.J. Forum 149, 159–61 (2016) (discussing future 
applications of the Whole Woman’s Health majority’s careful scrutiny of 
scientific evidence to other purportedly health-related abortion 
restrictions). 
15. See, e.g., Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 14, at 157–58; DiBranco, supra 
note 14, at 19; Imani Gandy, After ‘Whole Woman’s Health’ Decision, 
Advocates Should Fight Ultrasound Laws With Science, Rewire (July 29, 
2016, 2:41 PM), https://rewire.news/article/2016/07/29/whole-womans-
health-ultrasound-laws-science/ [https://perma.cc/77YN-9FGX]. 
16. See generally Fourteenth Amendment—Due Process Clause—Undue 
Burden: Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 130 Harv. L. Rev. 397 
(2016). 
17. Although the word “women” and female pronouns are used throughout 
this Note—reflecting the language used by courts in abortion-related 
decisions—the author acknowledges that these terms can have the effect 
of erasing the experiences of transgender and non-binary individuals, who 
are often left out of conversations about abortion rights. Transgender and 
non-binary people have abortions and are harmed by abortion restrictions. 
See, e.g., Key Facts on Abortion, Amnesty Int’l, https://www.amnesty. 
org/en/what-we-do/sexual-and-reproductive-rights/abortion-facts/ [https:// 
perma.cc/38NL-W7HK] (last visited Dec. 16, 2018). Furthermore, clinics 
that perform abortions often also provide transgender health services, and 
their closure can have serious consequences outside of abortion access for 
those relying on these services. See, e.g., Chanel Dubofsky, Why Trans 
and Non-Binary People Must Be Included in the Abortion Conversation, 
HelloFlo (Feb. 23, 2018), http://helloflo.com/trans-and-non-binary-
folks-must-be-part-of-conversations-about-abortion/ [https://perma.cc/ 
CLL5-TNV3]. 
18. Reva Siegal coined the term “woman-protective abortion restrictions” in 
her 2007 article about these restrictions. Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics 
of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of Woman-Protective Abortion 
Restrictions, 2007 U. Ill. L. Rev. 991 (2007). To be clear, the use of this 
term throughout this Note in no way implies an assumption that the 
restrictions actually have the purpose or effect of benefiting women. 
19. See, e.g., Mary Ziegler, Substantial Uncertainty: Whole Woman’s Health 
v. Hellerstedt and the Future of Abortion Law, 2016 Sup. Ct. Rev. 77, 
78 (2017) (noting that “Whole Woman’s Health set the stage for fact-
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seemingly fortified the constitutional right to abortion access, this Note 
demonstrates how ambiguities in the majority opinion have made the 
decision incredibly vulnerable to manipulation by unsympathetic lower 
courts. This Note also identifies potential pitfalls that advocates will 
need to address in future challenges, and it suggests ways of dealing 
with some of those pitfalls through a careful reading of Whole Woman’s 
Health. 
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the evolution of abortion 
jurisprudence in the United States. Part II critically evaluates the 
Whole Woman’s Health majority’s analysis of the “benefits prong” of 
the undue-burden balancing test. Part III engages in a similar analysis 
of the “burdens prong.” Part IV dissects some of the decision’s 
ambiguities, which raise questions regarding the correct application of 
the standard of review in future challenges of abortion restrictions. 
I. Evolution of Abortion Jurisprudence: From Roe to 
Whole Woman’s Health 
A. Recognizing a Constitutional Right to Abortion and Adopting the 
Trimester Framework 
In Roe v. Wade,20 the Supreme Court held that the substantive due 
process right to privacy encompasses a woman’s right to choose to 
terminate her pregnancy. However, the Court determined that this 
right is not unlimited, recognizing as valid state interests in protecting 
women’s health and potential human life.21 Citing medical evidence 
demonstrating that first trimester abortions are safer than childbirth, 
the Court determined that states could regulate abortion for the 
purpose of protecting women’s health only after the first trimester.22 
The Court held that states’ interest in potential life became compelling 
after the point of fetal viability,23 which medical evidence suggested 
could occur as early as twenty-four weeks into a pregnancy.24 
Accordingly, the Court held that states could regulate or ban abortion 
for the purpose of protecting fetal life during the third trimester, 
                                                                
intensive litigation about the benefits and burdens of measures restricting 
access to abortion,” and “could provide far less reliable protection for 
abortion rights than might appear”); R. Alta Charo, Whole Women’s 
Victory—or Not?, 375 New Eng. J. Med. 809 (2016). 
20. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
21. Id. at 162–63. 
22. Id. at 163. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. at 160.  
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“except when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the 
mother.”25 
Justice Blackmun’s opinion outlined some of the potential negative 
impacts of forced pregnancy and forced motherhood, including tolls on 
a woman’s mental and physical health, economic burdens, and stigma.26 
However, the opinion has been criticized for failing to “identif[y] the 
ways in which laws restricting abortion are inherently discriminatory 
[against women].”27 
Roe has also been criticized for relying almost entirely on empirical 
evidence to support drawing a line at viability, while failing to analyze 
“the constitutional principles that directed the choice of the particular 
line drawn.”28 Without a constitutional justification, commentators 
                                                                
25. Id. at 163–64. 
26. Justice Blackmun asserted: 
Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a 
distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. 
Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care. There is 
also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted 
child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family 
already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In 
other cases, as in this one, the additional difficulties and 
continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be involved.  
 Id. at 153.  
 Interestingly, while the opinion contained ample citations to medical 
evidence and scientific studies, Blackmun did not cite any social science 
or other evidence in support these particular conclusions. In fact, “neither 
the Supreme Court nor the district court made any references to social 
science literature in any of the opinions written for Roe v. Wade.” 
Rosemary J. Erickson & Rita J. Simon, The Use of Social Science 
Data in Supreme Court Decisions 43 (1998). However, “considerable 
social science material was brought before the Court in the combined cases 
of Roe and Doe” through briefs. Id. at 44. Blackmun also may have come 
across evidence of these harms in his independent research. 
27. Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, Abortion: A Woman’s Private 
Choice, 95 Tex. L. Rev. 1189, 1211–12 (2017). Chemerinsky and 
Goodwin argue that Roe would have been a stronger decision if it had 
included the description of abortion restrictions’ discriminatory 
assumptions and impact that Blackmun wrote almost twenty years later 
in his Casey concurrence. Id. (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 928–29 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part)). 
28. Steven R. Schlesinger & Janet Nesse, Justice Harry Blackmun and 
Empirical Jurisprudence, 29 Am. U. L. Rev. 405, 427 (1980) (emphasis 
added); see also Nancy K. Rhoden, Trimesters and Technology: 
Revamping Roe v. Wade, 95 Yale L.J. 639, 643 (1986) (“The abortion 
framework in Roe had . . . important underpinnings that were not 
articulated explicitly—mainly, the assumption that a viable fetus was one 
that was substantially developed and had reached ‘late’ gestation, and the 
ethical precept that late in gestation a fetus is so like a baby that elective 
abortion can be forbidden.”). 
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have long expressed concern that a woman’s right to choose will erode 
with advances in medical technology that push the point of viability 
earlier and earlier.29 
B. Undoing Roe’s Trimester Framework 
Following Roe, the Court struck down numerous abortion 
restrictions under the trimester framework. In City of Akron v. Akron 
Center for Reproductive Health (Akron I),30 for example, the Court 
struck down multiple provisions of an Akron, Ohio, ordinance, 
including, among others, a requirement that abortions be performed in 
hospitals after the first trimester, “informed-consent” requirements, and 
a mandatory twenty-four-hour waiting period after signing a consent 
form.31 Some of these regulations represented an organized effort by the 
anti-abortion movement to pass abortion restrictions justified by largely 
unsubstantiated claims regarding the risks abortion posed to women’s 
mental and physical health.32 The informed-consent provision 
challenged in Akron I required physicians to tell their patients that: 
[A]bortion is a major surgical procedure which can result in 
serious complications, including hemorrhage, perforated uterus, 
infection, menstrual disturbances, sterility and miscarriage and 
prematurity in subsequent pregnancies; and . . . abortion may 
leave essentially unaffected or may worsen any existing 
psychological problems [a woman] may have, and can result in 
severe emotional disturbances.33 
Reproductive rights advocates provided evidence “refut[ing] the 
factual arguments supporting the ordinance,” including psychological 
studies that found no connection between abortion and adverse 
psychological outcomes.34 
In striking down the ordinance, the Court rejected the medical and 
psychological claims made in support of the restrictions and noted that 
“the safety of second-trimester abortions ha[d] increased dramatically” 
since the Court decided Roe v. Wade.35 Justice O’Connor dissented, 
                                                                
29. See, e.g., Schlesinger & Nesse, supra note 28, at 427 (“[E]ach time medical 
science advances the point of viability, the state’s compelling interest in 
protection of fetal life will encroach further upon the woman’s rights to 
privacy and reproductive autonomy.”). 
30. 462 U.S. 416 (1983), overruled by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992). 
31. Id. at 422–24, 426, 452. 
32. Ziegler, supra note 19, at 83–84. 
33. Akron I, 462 U.S. at 423 n.5 (quoting Akron Ordinance No. 60-1978 
§ 1870.06). 
34. Ziegler, supra note 19, at 85. 
35. Akron I, 462 U.S. at 435–36, 444–45. 
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criticizing the trimester framework and the limitations it placed on the 
government’s ability to advance its interest in protecting fetal life, and 
raising the idea of a more deferential “undue burden” analysis.36 
Undeterred by Akron I, abortion opponents continued their efforts 
to disseminate the idea that abortion has negative psychological 
consequences and began to strategically manufacture an evidentiary 
basis for this claim.37 These efforts eventually paid off. 
A shift in the make-up of the Court called the future of Roe and 
the constitutional right to abortion into question. In Webster v. 
Reproductive Health Services,38 the Court upheld a Missouri statute 
prohibiting abortion and related research in public facilities,39 defining 
the beginning of life at the point of conception, and requiring physicians 
to test for fetal viability before performing an abortion twenty weeks 
or later into a woman’s pregnancy. Notably, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
argued in his plurality opinion, which was joined by Justices White and 
                                                                
36. Id. at 459–66 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
37. See Aziza Ahmed, Medical Evidence and Expertise in Abortion 
Jurisprudence, 41 Am. J.L. & Med. 85, 97–98 (2015); Ziegler, supra note 
19, at 89–90. Mary Ziegler provides an insightful discussion of the 
inception of this strategy: 
Movement leaders argued for the creation of research 
organizations that could collect proof that abortion hurt women 
and convince key decision makers, particularly politicians, that 
legal abortion did more harm than good. Victor Rosenblum and 
Thomas Marzen of [Americans United for Life] claimed that the 
movement might have more success promoting laws that 
supposedly benefited women if pro-lifers could popularize enough 
“[f]avorable statistical data.” As the two explained:  
“Accepted medical practices” must change before 
barriers to reversal can be broken down; whether or 
not abortion is “acceptable” is determined by the 
view and customary practices of the very people who 
perform abortions. They are unwilling to increase 
the state’s authority to regulate abortion. A possible 
long-term approach to meeting this dilemma is the 
development of new sources for abortion data.  
Creating new research organizations would allow abortion 
opponents to more confidently make claims about the facts. As 
importantly, even if the courts did not buy the movement’s factual 
claims, abortion opponents could work through politics to create 
enough scientific uncertainty about what “accepted medical 
practices” should involve. 
 Ziegler, supra note 19, at 90. 
38. 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
39. Id. at 509. This prohibition included a health exception. Id. at 501. 
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Kennedy, that Roe’s trimester framework had “proved ‘unsound in 
principle and unworkable in practice.’”40 
Although after Webster it appeared that the Court would overturn 
Roe, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,41 
the Supreme Court surprisingly reaffirmed Roe’s “central holding” that 
“the State’s interests are not strong enough to support a prohibition of 
abortion or the imposition of a substantial obstacle to the woman’s 
effective right to elect the procedure.”42 The controlling plurality 
decision, however, replaced Roe’s trimester framework with a new 
“undue burden” standard.43 Under this standard, states are permitted 
to pass pre-viability abortion restrictions that promote their recognized 
interests in protecting the health of the mother or protecting potential 
life, so long as the restrictions do not impose an “undue burden” on a 
woman’s decision to terminate her pregnancy. However, “a statute 
which, while furthering [a] valid state interest, has the effect of placing 
a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman’s choice cannot be 
considered a permissible means of serving its legitimate ends.”44 The 
Court further explained that “[u]nnecessary health regulations that 
have the purpose or effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a 
woman seeking an abortion impose an undue burden on the right.”45 
Applying this new standard, the plurality upheld all but one of the 
challenged abortion restrictions. Citing numerous studies and expert 
testimony on domestic abuse, the plurality struck down Pennsylvania’s 
spousal-notice requirement.46 In response to the state’s contention that 
the requirement “imposes almost no burden at all for the vast majority 
of women seeking abortions,” the Court advised that “[t]he analysis 
does not end with the one percent of women upon whom the statute 
operates; it begins there.”47 Based on the empirical evidence in the 
record, the plurality held that the requirement was an undue burden 
because “in a large fraction of the cases in which [the requirement] is 
relevant, it will operate as a substantial obstacle to a woman’s choice 
                                                                
40. Id. at 518 (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 
528, 546 (1985)). 
41. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
42. Id. at 845–46. 
43. Id. at 873, 876. 
44. Id. at 877. 
45. Id. at 878. 
46. Id. at 888–94. 
47. Id. at 894. The Court further specified that the restriction’s “real target 
is narrower even than the class of women seeking abortions identified by 
the State: it is married women seeking abortions who do not wish to notify 
their husbands of their intentions and who do not qualify for one of the 
statutory exceptions to the notice requirement.” Id. at 895. 
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to undergo an abortion.”48 This language was subsequently interpreted 
as an articulation of the correct test for determining whether the facial 
invalidation of a challenged abortion restriction is proper.49 
In contrast, the Court upheld a parental-notice requirement, clinic-
reporting requirements, and an informed consent requirement similar 
to the one it struck down in Akron I that required women to receive 
information about abortion’s supposed mental health risks at least 
twenty-four hours before they underwent the procedure, overruling this 
aspect of the Akron I decision.50 Amici briefs submitted in support of 
the Pennsylvania restrictions “presented the very possibility of 
postabortion trauma as a justification for abortion restrictions” and 
“suggested that the questions remained too open to expose women to 
the risk of harm.”51 The trial court found that the testimony presented 
in support of these claims lacked credibility.52 However, in holding that 
the restrictions furthered Pennsylvania’s woman-protective interests, 
the Supreme Court ignored both the trial court’s assessment and the 
empirical evidence presented by the challengers and amici showing a 
lack of causal connection between abortion and mental health problems: 
It cannot be questioned that psychological well-being is a facet of 
health. Nor can it be doubted that most women considering an 
abortion would deem the impact on the fetus relevant, if not 
dispositive, to the decision. In attempting to ensure that a woman 
apprehend the full consequences of her decision, the State furthers 
the legitimate purpose of reducing the risk that a woman may 
elect an abortion, only to discover later, with devastating 
psychological consequences, that her decision was not fully 
informed. If the information the State requires to be made 
available to the woman is truthful and not misleading, the 
requirement may be permissible.53 
The Court cited no evidence in support of these supposedly indisputable 
assumptions. 
The district court had found that the twenty-four-hour waiting 
period requirement would likely delay a woman’s ability to obtain an 
abortion by forcing her to make two separate visits to an abortion 
provider. The resulting increase in travel distance, time, and cost would 
be particularly burdensome on “those women who have the fewest 
financial resources, those who must travel long distances, and those who 
                                                                
48. Id. at 895, 925. 
49. See infra notes 81–84 and accompanying text. 
50. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, at 881–87. 
51. Ziegler, supra note 19, at 96 (emphasis added). 
52. Id. at 97. 
53. Casey, 505 U.S. at 882. 
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have difficulty explaining their whereabouts to husbands, employers, or 
others.”54 The Casey plurality accepted these findings but held that 
these burdens did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation under 
the new undue-burden standard.55 According to the Court, “[n]ot all 
burdens on the right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy will 
be undue.”56 
C. Stenberg and Gonzales 
In Stenberg v. Carhart,57 the Court struck down a Nebraska law 
banning so-called “partial birth abortions” (commonly referred to as 
dilation and extraction, or “D&X” abortions, by medical professionals) 
for two independent reasons.58 The Court held that the ban placed an 
undue burden on the substantive due process right to abortion because 
the statutory language was broad enough to also encompass the most 
common method of abortion after the first trimester (called dilation and 
evacuation, or “D&E”).59 The Court also held that the law was 
unconstitutional due to its lack of a health exception.60 Although the 
Court was presented with contrary testimony regarding the existence 
of situations in which D&X would be safer than D&E, the Court found 
that “the division of medical opinion about the matter at most means 
uncertainty, a factor that signals the presence of risk, not its absence.”61 
In response to the Stenberg decision, Congress passed a federal 
“partial birth abortion” ban, which used more specific language to 
describe the banned procedure but still omitted a health exception.62 
The Supreme Court upheld this law in Gonzales v. Carhart.63 Despite 
its contrary holding in Stenberg, the Court declined to invalidate the 
statute on its face for lacking a health exception, but left open the 
possibility of an as-applied challenge. The Court differentiated the 
federal law from the one it struck down in Stenberg, finding that the 
                                                                
54. Id. at 885–86 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 
1323, 1352 (E.D. Pa. 1990)). 
55. Id. at 886. The Court noted that the district court invalidated the waiting 
period requirement after applying strict scrutiny, and “did not conclude 
that the increased costs and potential delays amount[ed] to substantial 
obstacles.” Id. Of course, the district court could not have been expected 
to apply a standard that the Court had not yet articulated. 
56. Id. at 876. 
57. 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
58. Id. at 927, 930. 
59. Id. at 938–39, 945–46. 
60. Id. at 937–38. 
61. Id. at 937. 
62. Partial-Birth Abortion Plan Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2019).  
63. 550 U.S. 124, 132–33 (2007). 
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statutory language adequately distinguished D&X from D&E and only 
proscribed the former method.64 
The Court accepted the purposes of the law that Congress set forth 
in the legislative findings, which the Court characterized as 
“express[ing] respect for the dignity of human life” and “protecting the 
integrity and ethics of the medical profession.”65 The majority found 
that the D&X ban furthered these objectives by creating a “dialogue 
that better informs the political and legal systems, the medical 
profession, expectant mothers, and society as a whole of the 
consequences that follow from a decision to elect a late-term abortion.”66 
The Court then concluded that “it is a reasonable inference” that this 
“dialogue” could “encourage some women to carry the infant to full 
term, thus reducing the absolute number of late-term abortions” and 
may encourage “[t]he medical profession . . . [to] find different and less 
shocking methods to abort the fetus in the second trimester, thereby 
accommodating legislative demand.”67 The Court rejected the argument 
that D&E could be considered equally or more “brutal” than D&X, 
finding that Congress was reasonable in singling out D&X because of 
similarities Congress saw between D&X and the “delivery process.”68 
The Court also recognized a “woman-protective” governmental 
interest in banning D&X. Citing an amicus brief recounting the 
personal experiences of individual women after having an abortion, 
Justice Kennedy asserted that “it seems unexceptionable to conclude 
some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they 
once created and sustained,” potentially leading to “[s]evere depression 
and loss of esteem,” but Justice Kennedy admitted that the Court 
“f[ou]nd no reliable data to measure the phenomenon.”69 The majority 
also found that most physicians did not describe the D&X procedure to 
their patients and declared that women would experience psychological 
harm if they learned about the procedure after it was performed.70 In 
sum, it determined that the ban furthered the government’s “interest 
in ensuring so grave a choice is well informed.”71 
                                                                
64. Id. at 150–56. 
65. Id. at 157. 
66. Id. at 160. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 159 (citing Brief of Sandra Cano et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner, Gonzales, 550 U.S. 124 (No. 05-380)). 
70. Id. at 159–60. Once again, Justice Kennedy supported this claim with no 
evidence, declaring that this alleged harm was “self-evident.” Id. at 159. 
71. Id. In a vigorous dissent, Justice Ginsburg criticized the majority’s 
unsupported assertion regarding the risk of psychological consequences, as 
well as the Court’s approval of a “solution” that “deprives women of the 
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When analyzing the burden imposed by the ban, the Court was 
faced with contradictory evidence regarding the relative safety of D&X 
in comparison to D&E, both generally and under specific 
circumstances.72 Rather than view this medical uncertainty as a reason 
to invalidate the law, as the Court had seven years earlier in Stenberg, 
the Court held that “medical uncertainty over whether the [law’s] 
prohibition creates significant health risks provides a sufficient basis to 
conclude in this facial attack that the Act does not impose an undue 
burden.”73 Furthermore, in determining that the “facial attacks should 
not have been entertained,” the Court echoed the “large fraction” 
language used in Casey’s facial invalidation of the spousal-notice 
requirement.74 
D. Ambiguities and Circuit Splits in the Wake of Casey and Gonzales 
The Court’s decisions in Casey and Gonzales inspired differing 
interpretations of the correct application of the undue-burden test.75 
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits, along with various district courts, 
applied a balancing test, “weigh[ing] the burdens against the state’s 
justification, [and] asking whether and to what extent the challenged 
regulation actually advances the state’s interests. If a burden 
significantly exceeds what is necessary to advance the state’s interests, 
it is ‘undue,’ which is to say unconstitutional.”76 Courts applying this 
approach considered evidence outside of the legislative record in 
analyzing both the benefits of a challenged regulation in relation to the 
purported governmental interest in its passing, as well as the actual or 
anticipated burdens the regulation places on the exercise of the abortion 
right.77 
In contrast, the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits declined to apply 
a balancing test, instead engaging in a more deferential two-part 
                                                                
right to make an autonomous choice, even at the expense of their safety.” 
Id. at 183–34 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
72. Id. at 161–63. 
73. Id. at 164. 
74. Id. at 167–68 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833 at 895 (1992)) (noting that the “respondents ha[d] not demonstrated 
that the Act would be unconstitutional in a large fraction of relevant 
cases”). 
75. Gillian Metzger, Symposium: Hanging in the Balance, SCOTUSblog (Jan. 
6, 2016, 9:23 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/01/symposium- 
hanging-in-the-balance/ [https://perma.cc/SN6E-FEY5]. 
76. Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Schimel, 806 F.3d 908, 919–20 (7th 
Cir. 2015) (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Planned 
Parenthood Ariz., Inc. v. Humble, 753 F.3d 905, 913 (9th Cir. 2014)). 
77. See, e.g., id.; Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 
786, 790–93 (7th Cir. 2013). 
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analysis.78 When considering a challenge to an abortion restriction, 
these courts determined whether the restriction satisfied rational-basis 
review, and then determined whether the restriction had the purpose 
or effect of creating a substantial obstacle to obtaining an abortion.79 
Under this test, restrictions were upheld as long as they did not create 
a substantial obstacle and were rationally related to a legitimate 
government interest. Because “the rational basis test seeks only to 
determine whether any conceivable rationale [for enacting a regulation] 
exists,” these courts argued that it is not the judiciary’s role to 
independently evaluate the extent to which a regulation actually 
furthers a legitimate governmental interest.80 
Casey’s ambiguous “large fraction test” also proved difficult for 
courts to apply and has been interpreted inconsistently. Numerous 
courts have interpreted this language as imposing a distinct test for 
determining whether facial challenges to abortion regulations could be 
sustained, which requires plaintiffs to demonstrate that the regulation 
was unduly burdensome in a large fraction of relevant cases.81 Courts 
have struggled to define the appropriate numerator and denominator 
                                                                
78. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 769 F.3d 285, 297 (5th Cir. 2014) 
(citing Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. 
Abbott (Abbott II), 748 F.3d 583, 593–94, 597 (5th Cir. 2014)), vacated 
in part, 135 S. Ct. 399 (2014); Planned Parenthood Sw. Ohio Region v. 
DeWine, 696 F.3d 490, 506–07 (6th Cir. 2012); Greenville Women’s Clinic 
v. Bryant, 222 F.3d 157 (4th Cir. 2000); and Women’s Health Ctr. of W. 
Cnty., Inc. v. Webster, 871 F.2d 1377 (8th Cir. 1989)); see also Metzger, 
supra note 75. 
79. Lakey, 769 F.3d at 297 (citing Abbott II, 748 F.3d at 593–94, 597). As 
Justice Thomas argues in his Whole Woman’s Health dissent, this 
interpretation stems from language used by the majority in Gonzales. 
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2324 (2016) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Gonzales, 550 U.S. 124, 158 (2007)). In 
upholding the federal ban on the D&X procedure, the Gonzales majority 
asserted that “[w]here [the legislature] has a rational basis to act, and it 
does not impose an undue burden, the State may use its regulatory power 
to bar certain procedures and substitute others, all in furtherance of its 
legitimate interests in regulating the medical profession in order to 
promote respect for life, including life of the unborn.” 550 U.S. at 158. 
80. Abbott II, 748 F.3d at 594. 
81. For example, in Gonzales, the majority acknowledged the existing 
confusion over the required showing for sustaining a facial challenge. The 
majority cited two possible tests: a facial challenge could be sustained by 
showing that “no set of circumstances exists under which the [challenged 
law] would be valid,” or a facial challenge could be sustained by 
demonstrating that the “statute would impose an undue burden ‘in a large 
fraction of the cases in which [it] is relevant.’” Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 167 
(quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895 
(1992); also citing Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 
514 (1990)). The Court did not see the need to resolve the issue because 
it found that the petitioners did not meet the latter standard. Id. at 167–
68. 
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for this calculation, leading to widely ranging outcomes. The district 
court opinion in Cincinnati Women’s Services, Inc. v. Taft82 provided 
an on-point summary of the difficult questions raised by the rule: 
The “large fraction” standard enunciated in Casey by nature 
invites the courts and the parties to engage in a number-
crunching exercise to assess the impact of an abortion 
regulation. . . . Nevertheless, stating that a “large fraction” 
constitutes a substantial obstacle is not the same thing as defining 
a “large fraction.” Because the Supreme Court instructs that the 
constitutional analysis should focus on only those women for 
whom the restriction is actually relevant, the argument devolves 
to which group of women is properly considered the numerator 
and which group of women is properly considered the 
denominator. Even if a court properly identifies the numerator 
and denominator, it still must decide whether the resulting 
fraction is “large.” Again, the Casey Court provides no real 
guidance.83 
These ambiguities allowed the test to be manipulated in order to 
reach a desired result, particularly by defining the denominator more 
narrowly or broadly.84 
Questions about the application of both of these tests, as well as 
other disputed interpretations of Gonzales, played a considerable role 
in Whole Woman’s Health. 
E. TRAP Laws and Whole Woman’s Health 
After the Supreme Court in Casey recognized a pre-viability 
governmental interest in regulating abortion to protect women’s health, 
one of the major legislative strategies put forth by anti-abortion 
advocacy groups, including Americans United for Life (“AUL”), focused 
on undermining the constitutional right to abortion by “subjecting 
abortion to increasingly burdensome forms of regulation.”85 These 
Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers (“TRAP”) laws, as critics 
call them, impose regulations on abortion providers that are difficult 
and expensive to comply with, are unsupported by health and safety 
principles, and typically are not imposed on other healthcare procedures 
                                                                
82. 468 F.3d 361 (6th Cir. 2006). 
83. Id. at 377–78 (Rogers, J., concurring) (quoting Cincinnati Women’s 
Servs., Inc. v. Taft, 466 F. Supp. 2d 934, 939 (S.D. Ohio 2005)) (internal 
citation omitted). 
84. See id. at 376–77. 
85. Cary Franklin, Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt and What It Means 
to Protect Women, Reproductive Rights and Justice Stories 
(forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 3) (available at https://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=3206983). 
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with comparable or greater risks.86 These laws increase costs for 
abortion providers and can lead to widespread clinic closures.87 While 
the purpose of model TRAP laws written by organizations like AUL is 
to undermine Roe and decrease abortion access, the carefully 
constructed legislative messaging alleges that the primary goal of the 
regulations is to “safeguard maternal health—to protect pregnant 
women from dangerous providers and to ensure that abortion is 
performed in safe environments.”88 Advocates of this strategy “argued 
that legislators ought to be given wide latitude” to enact regulations 
that purport to further that goal.89 
The efforts to restrict abortion access through strategic regulation 
picked up speed following the 2010 midterm elections, as “scores of Tea 
Party and other conservative candidates for whom ending abortion was 
a key priority” entered office.90 Texas’s passage of H.B. 2 in 2013 
reflected these national trends.91 
The constitutionality of H.B. 2’s admitting-privileges requirement 
was first challenged by several abortion clinics and providers, who 
sought a facial invalidation of the requirement in Planned Parenthood 
of Greater Texas Surgical Health Services v. Abbott.92 The district court 
preliminarily enjoined the requirement, but the Fifth Circuit vacated 
this injunction, allowing the requirement to go into effect.93 After the 
issue was tried in full, the district court permanently enjoined the 
admitting-privileges provision, holding that it unduly burdened Texas 
women seeking an abortion.94 The Fifth Circuit reversed the lower 
court’s decision as to the admitting-privileges requirement, upholding 
it as constitutional, in part because it found the plaintiffs did not 
sufficiently “show that abortion practitioners will likely be unable to 
comply with the privileges requirement.”95 
                                                                
86. Id. (manuscript at 4). 
87. See id. 
88. Id. (manuscript at 3–4) (emphasis in original). 
89. Id. (manuscript at 4). 
90. Id. (manuscript at 5).  
91. Id.  
92. 951 F. Supp. 2d 891, 901 (W.D. Tex. 2013). 
93. Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott 
(Abbott I), 734 F.3d 406, 419 (5th Cir. 2013). The plaintiffs also challenged 
H.B. 2’s restrictions on medication abortions. Id. at 409. 
94. Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health Servs. v. Abbott, 
951 F. Supp. 2d 891, 909 (W.D. Tex. 2013), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 
and remanded, Abbot II, 748 F.3d 583 (5th Cir. 2014). 
95. Abbott II, 748 F.3d at 592, 598. The plaintiffs did not file a petition for 
certiorari. Some of the plaintiffs, however, joined a separate challenge 
brought shortly after this decision was announced. See infra note 97 and 
accompanying text.  
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In the time between the Fifth Circuit’s decision vacating the 
injunction and its decision upholding the restriction, nineteen of Texas’s 
abortion clinics had closed: eight in anticipation of the admitting-
privileges requirement taking effect and eleven more on the day that 
requirement officially took effect.96 Soon after the Fifth Circuit 
published its decision, another group of abortion clinics and providers—
including some of the plaintiffs from Abbott I—challenged H.B. 2’s 
admitting-privileges requirement as it applied to two Texas clinics in 
McAllen and El Paso. They also brought a facial challenge of the 
constitutionality of the ambulatory-surgical-center (“ASC”) 
requirement.97 After a four-day bench trial, the district court found that 
the two provisions had the combined effect of shuttering most of the 
abortion clinics in Texas.98 The district court permanently enjoined the 
enforcement of both challenged restrictions, holding that “the over-all 
effect of the provisions is to create an impermissible obstacle as applied 
to all women seeking a previability abortion.”99 
Once again, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s 
decision.100 Applying the two-step, rational basis/substantial obstacle 
analysis, the court held that the challenged restrictions were 
constitutional, except as applied to the McAllen clinic.101 The court 
determined that both of the challenged requirements “were rationally 
related to a legitimate state interest” in raising “the standard and 
quality of care for women seeking abortions and . . . protect[ing] the 
health and welfare of women seeking abortions.”102 The decision took 
issue with the district court’s independent analysis of the plaintiffs’ 
evidence regarding the lack of purported health benefits, declaring that 
“the district court erred by substituting its own judgment [as to the 
provisions’ effects] for that of the legislature, albeit . . . in the name of 
the undue burden inquiry.”103 
                                                                
96. See Grossman et al., supra note 9, at 498. 
97. Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 678 (W.D. Tex. 
2014). 
98. Id. at 687. 
99. Id. 
100. Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563, 567 (5th Cir. 
2015), modified, 790 F.3d 598, 599 (5th Cir. 2015), rev’d and remanded 
sub nom. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). 
101. Id. at 576, 594. The Fifth Circuit also overturned the lower court’s facial 
invalidation of the challenged provisions on procedural grounds, id. at 
580–83, but the Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit’s procedural 
rulings in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt. 136 S. Ct. 2292 at 2304–
09. A more detailed discussion of the procedural aspects of this case falls 
outside of the scope of this Note. 
102. Id. at 584. 
103. Id. at 587 (citing Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 163 (2007)). 
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The Fifth Circuit also found that the district court erred in its 
determination that the remaining clinics would not have the capacity 
to meet statewide demand for abortion care if the restrictions were 
upheld.104 Furthermore, the court concluded that the district court had 
erred in facially invalidating the challenged restrictions because the 
plaintiffs had not demonstrated that either restriction “imposes an 
undue burden on a large fraction of women.”105 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and a 5-3 majority reversed 
the Fifth Circuit’s ruling.106 After determining that the challenge was 
not precluded on procedural grounds, the Court provided clarification 
in regard to the correct application of the standard of review in 
substantive due process challenges to abortion regulations. The Court 
concluded that the Fifth Circuit’s application of the undue-burden 
standard was incorrect, because courts must “consider the burdens a 
law imposes on abortion access together with the benefits those laws 
confer.”107 The majority rejected outright the implication that a 
“district court should not consider the existence or nonexistence of 
medical benefits when considering whether a regulation of abortion 
constitutes an undue burden.”108 The Court also rejected the appellate 
court’s contention that “legislatures, and not courts, must resolve 
questions of medical uncertainty.”109 
The majority opinion, written by Justice Breyer, went on to analyze 
the restrictions’ medical benefits and the burden that they placed on 
Texas women’s right to choose to have an abortion, relying heavily on 
scientific evidence, public health studies, and demographic data. 
Ultimately, the Court held that the restrictions constituted undue 
burdens after weighing what the court determined to be a “virtual 
absence of any health benefit” against the cumulative impact of the 
restrictions’ various burdens.110 
Finally, the Court disposed of several of Texas’s remaining 
arguments, including those regarding H.B. 2’s severability clause and 
purportedly contrary Supreme Court precedent.111 Perhaps most 
                                                                
104. Id. at 589–90. 
105. Id. at 576, 590.  
106. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309–10 (2016). 
107. Id. at 2309 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
887–98 (1992)). 
108. Id. 
109. Id. at 2310. 
110. Id. at 2313. 
111. Id. at 2318–20. 
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critically, the Court rejected the Fifth Circuit’s application of the large-
fraction test, which Texas had urged the Court to apply.112 
II. Analyzing the Purported and Actual Benefits of 
Abortion Restrictions after Whole Woman’s Health 
Rather than deferring to Texas’s claims regarding the need to 
safeguard women’s health by imposing the challenged regulations on 
abortion providers, the Whole Woman’s Health majority independently 
analyzed the benefits of the H.B. 2 provisions, referring to scientific 
evidence, public health data, and medical expert testimony. This 
approach reversed a trend in abortion jurisprudence of deference to 
woman-protective arguments, which began in Casey. 
A. Recognizing Abortion as a Safe Medical Procedure 
In assessing the supposed health benefits of the challenged H.B. 2 
provisions, the Court cited studies and data showing that abortion has 
extremely low serious complication and mortality rates, both in Texas 
and across the country, and it determined that “there was no significant 
health-related problem that the [restrictions] helped to cure.”113 The 
Court’s recognition of evidence demonstrating that abortion is a 
remarkably safe medical procedure interrupts the strategic narrative 
advanced by anti-abortion advocates that characterizes “pregnant 
women and fetuses alike as victims of a dangerous and greedy abortion 
industry” and reframes abortion restrictions as necessary to protect 
women from these dangers.114 Without a legitimate health-related 
problem to address, the benefits of woman-protective abortion 
restrictions are called into serious question. 
Despite the Court’s recognition that abortion is a safe medical 
procedure, government defendants are likely to continue arguing that 
challenged regulations are necessary to protect women’s health. Going 
forward, however, defendants will need to provide evidence of specific 
health-related benefits to justify woman-protective abortion 
restrictions, rather than rely on general claims regarding the dangers 
associated with abortion.115 After all, future plaintiffs challenging 
woman-protective restrictions can easily counter such general claims by 
                                                                
112. Id. at 2320. For a more detailed discussion of this aspect of the Whole 
Woman’s Health decision, see infra Section IV.B. 
113. Id. at 2311, 2315. 
114. Franklin, supra note 85 (manuscript at 6). 
115. See, e.g., Burns v. Cline, 2016 OK 121, 387 P.3d 348 (Okla. 2016). In 
Burns v. Cline, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma rejected the State’s 
contention that the challenged admitting privileges requirement 
“advance[d] and protect[ed] women’s health,” citing the “national 
scientific evidence presented in Hellerstedt [that] disputed such claims.” 
Id. ¶ 18, 387 P.3d at 353. 
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demonstrating that the relevant state (or federal) abortion morbidity 
and complication rates are on par with the corresponding rates in 
Texas.  
Following Whole Woman’s Health, some courts have been more 
willing than others to entertain defendants’ claims regarding health 
risks. When abortion providers in Missouri brought a challenge to the 
state’s similar ASC and admitting-privileges requirements, the state 
argued that those regulations protect against the “physical risks of 
abortion procedures.”116 In response to evidence showing low abortion-
related complication rates presented by the plaintiffs, Missouri claimed 
that the plaintiffs—as well as abortion clinics across the country—
under-report abortion-related complications.117 The U.S. District Court 
for the Western District of Missouri granted the plaintiffs’ request for 
a preliminary injunction, declining to consider the “new material, copies 
of studies and expert opinions” presented by the state as evidence of 
the “dangerousness of abortions.”118 The court noted that it would be 
“impermissible judicial practice” to “reappraise the abortion safety 
issue, after the very extensive advocacy on both sides in Hellerstedt.”119  
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit took issue with the lower court’s 
refusal to consider the health- and safety-related evidence presented by 
Missouri.120 The court claimed that the Whole Woman’s Health 
majority’s benefits analysis relied on findings regarding the safety of 
abortion in Texas specifically, and raised the possibility that a “unique 
problem” exists in Missouri that “may require a different response than 
what was needed in Texas.”121 The Eighth Circuit vacated and 
remanded the decision granting the preliminary injunction, directing 
the district court to consider the evidence of the admitting-privilege 
requirement’s purported health-related benefits and weigh those 
                                                                
116. See, e.g., Brief of Appellants at 17–18, Comprehensive Health of Planned 
Parenthood Great Plains v. Hawley, 903 F.3d 750 (8th Cir. 2018) (No. 
17-1996). 
117. See The State Defendants’ Post-Hearing Supplemental Brief in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 4–7, 
Comprehensive Health of Planned Parenthood Great Plains v. Williams, 
263 F. Supp. 3d 729 (W.D. Mo. 2017) (No. 2:16-cv-04313). Texas raised 
similar arguments in Whole Woman's Health v. Lakey. 46 F. Supp. 3d 
673, 684 (W.D. Tex. 2014). The district court gave “appropriate weight 
to the experts' conflicting testimony,” and ultimately “conclude[d] that 
concerns over incomplete complication reporting and underestimated 
complication rates are largely unfounded and are without a reliable basis.” 
Id. 
118. Comprehensive Health of Planned Parenthood Great Plains v. Williams, 
263 F. Supp. 3d 729, 733 (W.D. Mo. 2017). 
119. Id. 
120. Comprehensive Health of Planned Parenthood Great Plains v. Hawley, 
903 F.3d 750, 758 (8th Cir. 2018). 
121. Id. at 758–59. 
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benefits against the evidence of the requirement’s burden.122 Although 
the district court subsequently declined to grant another preliminary 
injunction against the admitting privileges requirement, its decision 
focused on the sufficiency of the plaintiffs’ evidence of burden, and the 
court acknowledged that Missouri’s claims about the requirement’s 
woman-protective benefits were “dubious.”123 Even if the district court 
had determined that there was sufficient evidence demonstrating that 
abortion is less safe in Missouri than it is in Texas, Whole Woman’s 
Health would have required the court to determine whether the 
challenged abortion restriction actually addressed the purported safety 
issues in Missouri.124 
B. Critically Analyzing Evidence of Purported Benefits in the Abortion-
Specific Context 
After concluding that abortion was an incredibly safe procedure 
prior to the enactment of the challenged provisions, the Whole 
Woman's Health Court went on to analyze whether the challenged 
regulations actually provided any health benefit when imposed on 
abortion providers. The majority determined that the purported 
benefits of the ASC and admitting-privileges requirements were 
irrelevant in the abortion context. 
The Court first considered whether the admitting-privilege 
requirement would actually improve health outcomes for abortion 
patients. The Court cited evidence demonstrating that on the rare 
occasions that abortion patients “suffer complications requiring 
hospitalization, most of these complications occur in the days after the 
abortion,” and the patients “will likely seek medical attention at the 
hospital nearest [their] home[s].”125 Thus, requiring abortion providers 
to obtain admitting privileges at a hospital within thirty miles of the 
clinic would not improve health outcomes for abortion patients who 
experience complications.126 Furthermore, the Court concluded that the 
requirement “d[id] not serve any relevant credentialing function” after 
finding that providers were being denied admitting privileges for 
reasons unrelated to their competency, and the safety of abortion would 
                                                                
122. Id. at 758. To some extent, the evidentiary issues that arise in this case 
may result from the Whole Woman’s Health Court’s failure to explain 
who bears the burden of proof for each prong of the undue burden 
balancing test. A thorough explanation of evidentiary burdens in Whole 
Woman’s Health and future challenges of abortion restrictions falls outside 
of the scope of this Note. 
123. Comprehensive Health of Planned Parenthood Great Plains v. Williams, 
No. 2:16-cv-04313-BCW at 12 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 22, 2019). 
124. See discussion infra Section II.B. 
125. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2311 (2016). 
126. See id. at 2310–11. 
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make it difficult for providers to meet the required number of hospital 
admissions.127 
Next, the Court assessed the benefits of requiring abortion clinics 
to comply with the ASC requirements. The Court determined that the 
surgical-center requirements designed to “reduce infection where 
doctors conduct procedures that penetrate the skin” were inapplicable 
to abortion facilities because medication abortion involves the 
administration of pills taken orally and surgical abortion is “performed 
through the natural opening of the birth canal, which is itself not 
sterile.”128 Because abortion clinics “do not use general anesthesia or 
deep sedation,” the Court found the provisions aimed at “safeguard[ing] 
heavily sedated patients (unable to help themselves) during fire 
emergencies” completely unnecessary as well.129 
The majority also rejected the dissent’s contention that H.B. 2 
might force the closure of unsafe clinics like the facility run by Kermit 
Gosnell in Pennsylvania.130 The majority pointed out that “Gosnell’s 
deplorable crimes could escape detection only because his facility went 
uninspected for more than 15 years,” and “[p]re-existing Texas law 
already contained numerous detailed regulations covering abortion 
facilities, including a requirement that facilities be inspected at least 
annually.”131 In other words, “[d]etermined wrongdoers, already 
ignoring existing statutes and safety measures,” are unlikely to be 
deterred by the addition of more statutes and safety measures.132 
The Court’s analysis has several important implications for future 
challenges to abortion restrictions—particularly for TRAP laws that 
impose on abortion clinics the types of regulations typically reserved 
for facilities where much riskier procedures are performed. First, 
evidence that a regulation improves health outcomes in other medical 
contexts can be countered with evidence demonstrating why the 
regulations would not be beneficial when applied to abortion 
                                                                
127. Id. at 2312–13. 
128. Id. at 2315–16. 
129. Id. at 2316. 
130. Id. at 2313. The Court explained that: 
Gosnell, a physician in Pennsylvania, was convicted of first-degree 
murder and manslaughter. He staffed his facility with unlicensed 
and indifferent workers, and then let them practice medicine 
unsupervised and had [d]irty facilities; unsanitary instruments; an 
absence of functioning monitoring and resuscitation equipment; 
the use of cheap, but dangerous, drugs; illegal procedures; and 
inadequate emergency access for when things inevitably went 
wrong. 
 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
131. Id. at 2314. 
132. Id. at 2313–14. 
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specifically. Second, even if the government presents reliable evidence 
of an existing problem or health risk specific to abortion, the majority 
opinion in Whole Woman’s Health calls for courts to analyze the fit 
between the problem and the challenged restriction. 
C. The Role of Junk Science and Substantial Uncertainty After Whole 
Woman’s Health 
Many abortion restrictions—including ASC and admitting-
privileges requirements like those struck down in Whole Woman’s 
Health—are premised on scientifically unfounded assertions.133 States 
have passed counseling requirements that force providers to tell patients 
that abortion can cause mental health problems, infertility, and breast 
cancer, despite large bodies of evidence refuting all of these claims.134 
Legislative attempts to either ban abortion before viability or require 
physicians to perform additional risky and unnecessary procedures 
before terminating a pregnancy often rely on disproven “pseudoscience” 
regarding the point during a pregnancy when a fetus becomes capable 
of feeling pain.135 Although numerous peer-reviewed studies have 
contradicted abortion opponents’ claims regarding the negative 
psychological impact of abortion, states continue to pass laws that 
purport to protect women from post-abortion trauma.136 The list goes 
on and on. 
Despite numerous commentators declaring that Whole Woman’s 
Health marked the end of abortion restrictions justified by “junk 
science,” this conclusion is likely overstated. The Court restored 
heightened scrutiny to the undue-burden standard by calling for the 
independent judicial evaluation of evidence to determine whether 
abortion regulations yield their purported benefits. However, the Court 
did not change the applicable rules of evidence, and the majority 
opinion’s deference to the district court’s findings of fact leaves trial 
courts with a great deal of latitude when evaluating and weighing the 
evidence of abortion restrictions’ benefits and burdens in the future.137 
Judges typically receive empirical evidence through expert 
testimony and amicus curiae briefs.138 There are no “formal tests” 
dictating what material can or cannot be included in amicus curiae 
                                                                
133. Rachel Benson Gold & Elizabeth Nash, Flouting the Facts: State Abortion 
Restrictions Flying in the Face of Science, 20 Guttmacher Pol’y Rev. 
53, 53–54 (2017). 
134. Id. at 56. 
135. Id. at 56–57. 
136. See Susan A. Cohen, Still True: Abortion Does Not Increase Women’s 
Risk of Mental Health Problems, 16 Guttmacher Pol’y Rev. 13, 14–16 
(2013). 
137. See Zeigler, supra note 19, at 114. 
138. Erickson & Simon, supra note 26, at 19. 
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briefs; all kinds of “extralegal” materials may be entered into the 
record.139 As Justice Breyer explained in his majority opinion, the 
admissibility of expert testimony is determined under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.140 
While Daubert calls for trial court judges to analyze the reliability of 
expert evidence, judges’ effectiveness in determining reliability and 
their ability to truly understand and assess empirical research is a 
matter of debate.141 Critics point out that “judges have little empirical 
training”142 and “courts are ill equipped to assess social science research 
critically.”143 
The Supreme Court’s use of empirical evidence has not escaped 
criticism, particularly when deciding constitutional questions.144 Some 
commentators assert that the Court has ignored or distorted valid 
empirical evidence that seemingly contradicts a desired conclusion in 
specific cases.145 This critique is highly relevant to the Court’s abortion 
jurisprudence. 
                                                                
139. Id. at 32. 
140. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2317 (2016) (citing 
Daubert, 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993) (“[U]nder the Rules the trial judge must 
ensure that any and all [expert] evidence admitted is not only relevant, 
but reliable”)); see also Erickson & Simon, supra note 26, at 23–31. 
141. See, e.g., Ben K. Grunwald, Comment, Suboptimal Social Science and 
Judicial Precedent, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1409, 1412–13, 1439–40 (2013). 
142. Id. at 1439.  
143. Id. at 1413. 
144. See, e.g., Erickson & Simon, supra note 26; Wallace D. Loh, Social 
Research in the Judicial Process (1984); Paul S. Appelbaum, The 
Empirical Jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court, 13 Am. J.L. 
& Med. 335 (1987); Lee Epstein, Barry Friedman & Geoffrey R. Stone, 
Foreword: Testing the Constitution, 90 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1001 (2015); 
David L. Faigman, “Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding”: Exploring 
the Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 541 (1991); Grunwald, supra note 141; Dean M. Hashimoto, Science 
as Mythology in Constitutional Law, 76 Or. L. Rev. 111 (1997); John 
Monahan & Laurens Walker, Judicial Use of Social Science Research, 15 
Law & Human Behav. 571, 572 (1991) (citing Muller v. Oregon, 208 
U.S. 412 (1908)); Niels Petersen, Avoiding the Common-Wisdom Fallacy: 
The Role of Social Sciences in Constitutional Adjudication, 11 Int’l J. 
Const. L. 294 (2013); Rachael N. Pine, Speculation and Reality: The Role 
of Facts in Judicial Protection of Fundamental Rights, 136 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 655 (1988); Amy Rublin, The Role of Social Science in Judicial 
Decision Making: How Gay Rights Advocates Can Learn from Integration 
and Capital Punishment Case Law, 19 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol’y 179 
(2011). 
145. See, e.g., Faigman, supra note 144, at 505. Faigman, however, argues that 
the Court is still restrained to an extent by available empirical evidence 
because “persistent misapplication of empirical data undermines the 
Court’s legitimacy.” Id. at 604. 
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In both Casey and Gonzales, the Court upheld abortion restrictions 
after finding that they advanced the state’s interest in protecting 
women’s psychological health, ignoring substantial bodies of reliable 
evidence to the contrary.146 The plurality opinion in Casey drew 
conclusions about abortion’s psychological impact on women without 
citing supporting evidence from either side.147 The majority in Gonzales 
admitted that its assumption was unsupported by empirical evidence, 
citing instead to an amicus brief containing anecdotal stories from 
individual women who regretted having an abortion.148 Neither opinion 
acknowledged that the Court had been presented with peer-reviewed 
empirical studies that demonstrated a lack of correlation between 
abortion and negative psychological outcomes.149 
Anti-abortion activists’ strategic efforts to manufacture scientific 
uncertainty likely played a role in the outcomes of those cases.150 
Beginning in the 1980s, abortion opponents began funding research and 
gathering “scientific” evidence for the purpose of introducing 
“uncertainty” in relation to the safety of abortion and established 
medical practices, the impact on women’s psychological and physical 
health, and fetal pain.151 Although the purpose of gathering this 
evidence was to justify the need for various abortion restrictions, the 
goal was not to “establish convincing proof,” but “to show a lack of 
certainty.”152 The anti-abortion strategists believed that if they could 
convince courts that abortion might harm women or cause fetal pain, 
judges would uphold regulations purportedly addressing these potential 
harms, regardless of evidence to the contrary.153 Abortion opponents 
supplemented their pseudoscience with anecdotal testimonials, 
“contend[ing] that even if the risks of abortion could not be conclusively 
proven, women’s personal experiences made abortion restrictions a 
                                                                
146. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) (“While we find 
no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to 
conclude some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life 
they once created and sustained.”); see also Ahmed, supra note 37, at 98 
(discussing the Court’s rejection of evidence that abortion does not have 
a detrimental psychological impact on women in Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)). 
147. Casey, 505 U.S. at 882; see also supra notes 50–53 and accompanying 
text. 
148. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 159 (citing Brief of Sandra Cano et al., as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Gonzales, 550 U.S. 124 (No. 05-380)); see 
also supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text. 
149. Ahmed, supra note 37, at 97–98, 107–08. 
150. Zeigler, supra note 19, at 113–14. 
151. Id. at 79, 90. See also supra note 37.  
152. Id. at 93–94. 
153. Id. 
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necessary precaution.”154 As already discussed, these efforts were 
successful in both Casey and Gonzales.155 Gonzales, in particular, 
represented a major victory for advocates of this strategy, as some lower 
courts, including the Fifth Circuit, read Gonzales as requiring judicial 
deference to legislative judgment when scientific or medical uncertainty 
underlies an abortion regulation.156 The Whole Woman’s Health 
majority, however, unequivocally rejected this interpretation of 
Gonzales, and reaffirmed courts’ “independent constitutional duty to 
review factual findings where constitutional rights are at stake.”157  
The future impact of junk science and scientific uncertainty on 
abortion jurisprudence after Whole Woman’s Health is still not entirely 
clear. While the Whole Woman’s Health majority instructed lower 
courts “not [to] place dispositive weight” on legislative findings of 
fact,158 pseudoscientific and anecdotal evidence may still be presented 
in judicial proceedings. Trial courts continue to bear the responsibility 
of assessing the reliability of expert evidence and determining how much 
weight to give contradictory evidence. Justice Breyer’s opinion did not 
overtly disclaim the Gonzales majority’s reliance on scientific 
uncertainty and anecdotal evidence, and unsympathetic lower courts 
may continue to rely on evidence establishing the mere possibility of a 
threat to women’s health or fetal-life interests, even when presented 
with contradictory empirical evidence.159 However, the majority’s 
articulation of the undue-burden standard in Whole Woman’s Health 
should, in theory, provide plaintiffs with two potential strategies for 
confronting scientific uncertainty in future challenges. Plaintiffs may 
argue that concrete evidence of an abortion regulation’s burdens should 
                                                                
154. Id. at 95. 
155. See supra notes 146–149 and accompanying text. Scientific or medical 
uncertainty has also played a role in the Court’s analyses of the burdens 
imposed by challenged regulations. In finding that the challenged D&X 
ban did not constitute an undue burden, the Gonzales majority relied on 
“medical uncertainty” over whether banning the D&X procedure 
presented significant health risks for women. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 
U.S. 124, 164 (2007); see also supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text. 
156. See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563, 567 (5th Cir. 
2015) (citing Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 163–64, 166), modified, 790 F.3d 598, 
599 (5th Cir. 2015), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Whole Woman’s 
Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). 
157. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2310 (2016) 
(quoting Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 165) (emphasis omitted). 
158. Id. (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 165). 
159. Ziegler, supra note 19, at 109, 114. Mary Zeigler argues that if the “Whole 
Woman’s Health [opinion is taken] at face value, there is little stopping 
lower courts from upholding abortion restrictions whenever they can make 
factual findings that are not clearly erroneous and that support the 
conclusion that the balance of benefits and burdens supports the 
restriction.” Id. at 114. 
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outweigh evidence of an “uncertain” benefit. Moreover, plaintiffs should 
call on courts to scrutinize the “fit” between the challenged abortion 
restriction and the potential problem it purports to address. 
III. Analyzing the Burdens Imposed by Abortion 
Restrictions after Whole Woman’s Health 
While the Court’s recognition in Whole Woman’s Health of the 
overall safety of abortion as a medical procedure should make it more 
difficult for states to justify abortion restrictions by claiming they 
protect women’s health, the Court’s undue-burden analysis did not stop 
after finding that the state had failed to provide any evidence of a 
health benefit. Rather, the Court engaged in a fact-specific analysis of 
the burdens imposed by the admitting-privileges and ASC 
requirements, relying heavily on demographic data and public health 
evidence developed by researchers who studied the impact of H.B. 2 
after it went into effect.  
A. Important Take-Aways from the Majority’s Burden Analysis 
The Whole Woman’s Health majority’s pragmatic analysis of the 
burdens imposed by the ASC and admitting privileges requirements 
provided critical recognition of the real-world impact that TRAP laws 
have on abortion access. After finding sufficient evidence demonstrating 
that the challenged requirements caused widespread clinic closures, the 
Whole Woman’s Health majority highlighted a number of ways that 
clinic closures impacted abortion access in Texas. These burdens 
included increases in travel distance to the nearest abortion clinic, 
increases in wait times and crowding, and decreases in individualized 
patient care.160  The majority rejected theoretical speculation that 
clinics could expand their capacity enough to meet the statewide need 
for abortion services, noting the difficulty of compliance with the 
challenged requirements.161 Ultimately, the majority determined that 
the cumulative impact of the challenged provisions’ various burdens 
amounted to a substantial obstacle to abortion access that outweighed 
the provisions’ nonexistent medical benefits.162  
1. Capacity Analysis 
A significant portion of the majority’s burden analyses focused on 
the remaining clinics’ ability (or lack thereof) to sufficiently increase 
their capacity in the wake of the abrupt wave of clinic closures. The 
majority cited evidence gathered after the admitting privileges 
requirement went into effect, closing half of Texas’s abortion clinics. 
                                                                
160. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2313, 2318 
(2016). 
161. See discussion infra Section III.A.3. 
162. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2318. 
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These closures resulted in “fewer doctors, longer waiting times, and 
increased crowding,” thus demonstrating that the remaining clinics 
“were not able to accommodate increased demand.”163 The majority 
opinion also recited expert calculations of the total number of abortions 
performed annually in Texas, the average number of abortions that 
each clinic provides, and the average increase in the number of 
abortions that the remaining clinics would have to perform in order to 
meet the annual demand for abortion care.164 The Court found a 
sufficient evidential basis for inferring that the seven or eight clinics 
that would remain open if the ASC requirement went into effect would 
not be capable of meeting the statewide demand for abortion services.165 
The majority opinion then went on to consider the cumulative impact 
of the various capacity-related burdens (including appointment-
scheduling delays and decreased individualized patient attention) 
together with the burdens caused by the dramatic increases in travel 
distance to the nearest abortion clinic.166    
The capacity analysis articulated in Whole Woman’s Health has a 
wide range of potential applications. It provides a useful framework for 
analyzing the burdens caused by clinic closures in a smaller state, where 
increases in travel distance may not be nearly as drastic as they were 
in Texas.167 The capacity analysis can also be applied to abortion 
regulations that decrease the number of individual providers able to 
perform abortions in a state, even if no clinics are forced to close.168 
Finally, it may provide a helpful way to articulate the burdens caused 
by regulations that require providers to perform additional or more 
time-consuming procedures, as such requirements would likely decrease 
the number of abortions that providers are able to perform.169 
                                                                
163. Id. at 2313, 2318. 
164. See id. at 2301–02, 2316–18. 
165. See id. at 2316–18. 
166. Id. at 2313, 2318. 
167. However, future government defendants will likely try to distinguish 
Whole Woman’s Health by pointing to Texas’s sudden and dramatic 
decrease of abortion providers that would have required the remaining 
clinics to perform five times as many abortions. For further discussion, 
see infra Section III.B.2. 
168. Examples of laws that may have this effect include admitting privilege 
requirements, licensing requirements, and physician-only requirements. 
See supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text; see also An Overview of 
Abortion Laws, Guttmacher Inst. (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www. 
guttmacher.org/state-policy/explore/overview-abortion-laws [https://perma. 
cc/LV42-LT8V]. 
169. Such laws may include informed-consent laws that require physicians to 
provide the information in person, ultrasound requirements, and method 
bans that require physicians to induce fetal demise before performing a 
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2. Cumulative-Burden Analysis 
The majority’s consideration of the cumulative impact of multiple 
burdens seemingly opens the door for greater recognition of the real-
world consequences of abortion restrictions in future challenges. Prior 
to Whole Woman’s Health, the Court had dismissed concerns regarding 
the disparate impact of abortion regulations that merely inconvenienced 
some but were incredibly restrictive to others. The prime example of 
this is the Court’s decision to uphold the twenty-four-hour waiting 
period requirement in Casey.170 The district court had found that the 
twenty-four-hour waiting period, which required two visits to an 
abortion provider, would often delay abortions for much more than a 
day, increase travel distances, and increase costs.171 As a result, the 
requirement disproportionately burdened women who had limited 
financial resources, lived far away from the nearest clinic, or “ha[d] 
difficulty explaining their whereabouts to husbands, employers, or 
others.”172 The Casey plurality was “troubl[ed] in some respects” by 
these findings, but ultimately determined that the evidence in the 
record did not demonstrate that these increased costs and delays 
amounted to substantial obstacles for any population.173 
In Whole Woman’s Health, the Court was once again confronted 
with lower court findings regarding the burdens imposed by increased 
travel distances and the “particularly high barrier [they created] for 
poor, rural, or disadvantaged women.”174 Justice Breyer’s majority 
                                                                
dilation and evacuation abortion. See supra notes 30–33, 57–69 and 
accompanying text; see also Guttmacher, supra note 168. 
170. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887 (1992). 
171. Id. at 885–86 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 
1323, 1351–52 (E.D. Pa. 1990)). 
172. Id. at 886 (citing Casey, 744 F. Supp. at 1352). 
173. Id.  
174. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2302 (2016) 
(quoting Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 683 (W.D. 
Tex. 2014)). The district court also highlighted the combined impact of 
increased travel distances together with “practical concerns,” such as 
“lack of availability of child care, unreliability of transportation, 
unavailability of appointments at abortion facilities, unavailability of time 
off from work, immigration status and inability to pass border 
checkpoints, poverty level, the time and expense involved in traveling long 
distances, and other, inarticulable psychological obstacles.” Whole 
Woman's Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 683 (W.D. Tex. 2014). The 
court concluded that the cumulative impact of these factors together with 
increased travel distances amounted to “a de facto barrier to obtaining an 
abortion for a large number of Texas women of reproductive age 
who might choose to seek a legal abortion.” Id. Justice Breyer’s majority 
opinion in Whole Woman’s Health noted the combined impact of increases 
in travel distance “taken together with other[] [burdens] that the closings 
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opinion highlighted the significant increases in the necessary travel 
distance to reach an abortion provider in Texas, caused by the clinic 
closures. The Court cited evidence in the record showing that:  
[The] number of women of reproductive age living in a 
county . . . more than 150 miles from a provider increased from 
approximately 86,000 to 400,000 . . . and the number of women 
living in a county more than 200 miles from a provider [increased] 
from approximately 10,000 to 290,000.175  
The Court noted that, under Casey, “increased driving distances do not 
always constitute an ‘undue burden,’” and ultimately considered the 
cumulative impact of the increased travel distances together with all of 
the other burdens caused by the clinic closings.176 The majority’s 
wording seems to leave open the possibility that increased driving 
distances could constitute an undue burden when considered as the sole 
obstacle created by a challenged restriction. The opinion, however, does 
not clarify whether the increased driving distances that the Court 
details in its analysis are enough to independently support a finding of 
undue burden. 
The majority’s consideration of increased travel distances as part 
of its cumulative-burden analysis certainly represented progress 
towards a greater recognition that requiring women to travel long 
distances for abortion care is a substantial burden in and of itself. The 
Court, however, missed an opportunity to recognize the impact of 
increased travel distance and cost on the right to abortion. The Court 
was clear in Casey that its determination was “based on the 
insufficiency of the record before it,”177 leaving open the possibility of a 
different holding in the future. Numerous studies performed after Casey 
was decided have demonstrated that increased distance to the nearest 
abortion clinic does, in fact, impede women’s ability to obtain an 
abortion. The record in Whole Woman’s Health contained evidence 
showing that when distance to the nearest abortion clinic increases, 
women’s access decreases.178 However, these findings received no 
mention by the Court. 
                                                                
brought about,” 136 S. Ct. at 2313, but did not reference the district 
court’s specific findings regarding these practical concerns. 
175. Id. at 2313 (quoting Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d at 681) (internal quotes 
omitted). 
176. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 885–87) (joint opinion of 
O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ). 
177. Casey, 505 U.S. at 926 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
178. See, e.g., Joint Appendix Volume II, Direct Testimony of Daniel 
Grossman, M.D. at 248–49, Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (No. 
15-274) (citing Silvie Colman & Ted Joyce, Regulating Abortion: Impact 
on Patients and Providers in Texas, 30 J. Pol’y Analysis & Mgmt. 
775 (2011); Ushma D. Upadhyay et al., Denial of Abortion Because of 
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The majority opinion did, however, make it clear that burdens short 
of preventing women from obtaining an abortion can constitute 
“substantial obstacles” for the purposes of the undue-burden test. While 
the majority’s determination that the remaining clinics would not have 
the capacity to meet the statewide need for abortion services certainly 
implies that some Texas women would be unable to obtain a desired 
abortion, the Court’s analysis did not focus on the women who would 
be forced to forego the procedure entirely. Rather, the Court 
highlighted the numerous negative impacts on individuals attempting 
to obtain an abortion, such as increased driving distances, longer wait 
times, overcrowded facilities, and declines in quality of care and 
individualized attention. The Court held that these burdens taken 
together outweighed the lack of medical benefits and thus constituted 
an undue burden.179 This cumulative analysis opened the door for other 
burdens, previously dismissed as not sufficiently substantial, to amount 
to constitutional violations when considered together. 
3. Theoretical Possibilities Insufficient to Counter Evidence of Burden 
In analyzing the burden imposed by the challenged abortion 
restrictions, the majority rejected arguments made by both the dissent 
and Texas that suggested abortion clinics and providers could adapt to 
the increased need for their services if the challenged restrictions forced 
the majority of clinics to close. In his dissent, Justice Alito argued that 
the remaining clinics may have been able to “hire more physicians who 
perform abortions, utilize their facilities more intensively or efficiently, 
or shift the mix of services provided” in order to increase their 
capacity.180 Texas also argued that the few remaining clinics could 
“expand sufficiently” to serve the “60,000 to 72,000” women seeking 
                                                                
Provider Gestational Age Limits in the United States, 104 Am. J. Pub. 
Health 1687 (2014)); Brief of Amicus Curiae American Public 
Health Association in Support of Petitioners at 20 n.43, Whole Woman’s 
Health, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (No. 15-274) (citing Colman & Joyce, supra, at 
777–79; Stanley K. Henshaw, Factors Hindering Access to Abortion 
Services, 27 Family Planning Perspectives 54, 54 (1995)). The 
evidence Dr. Grossman discussed included a study of the impact of a 
Texas “law limiting the performance of abortions at sixteen weeks or later 
to ASCs and hospitals” that was enacted in 2003, which found that: 
[W]hen the law took effect, there was an immediate and dramatic 
reduction in both the number of licensed facilities in Texas able 
to provide abortion services at 16 weeks and later and in the 
number of abortions performed in Texas at those gestational ages. 
Two years later, the abortion rate for those gestational ages 
remained 50% below what it was prior to the law’s enactment.  
 Direct Testimony of Daniel Grossman, M.D., supra (citing Colman & 
Joyce, supra). 
179. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2318.  
180. Id. at 2347 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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abortions each year, and pointed to a new clinic that had opened which 
“serves 9,000 women annually.”181 
The majority was unconvinced by these theoretical scenarios. The 
majority found the contention that clinics could hire additional 
physicians “not [] quite as simple as the dissent suggest[ed],” considering 
that so many clinics were forced to close because they did not have a 
physician with admitting privileges.182 As for the argument that the 
remaining clinics could sufficiently expand to meet the increased need 
for services, the Court found that the plaintiffs “had satisfied their 
burden, [so] the obligation was on Texas, if it could, to present evidence 
rebutting that issue.”183 Texas did not present such evidence. While 
noting that the opening of the new clinic was outside the record, the 
Court found that the $26 million cost of constructing the new clinic was 
evidence “that requiring seven or eight clinics to serve five times their 
usual number of patients does indeed represent an undue burden on 
abortion access.”184 Finally, the Court highlighted the district court’s 
findings regarding the amount that it would cost existing abortion 
clinics to comply with the ASC requirements. The cost ranged from $1 
million for a clinic that already had adequate space, to $3 million for a 
clinic that would need to purchase additional land.185 The majority 
determined that these costs made it unlikely that more ASC-compliant 
clinics would “fill the gap” created by clinic closures.186 
The majority’s refusal to entertain unsubstantiated speculation 
that clinics may be able to adapt to unnecessary regulations so as to 
minimize the burdens these regulations place on abortion access has 
important implications for both pre- and post-enforcement challenges. 
If the Court had accepted these speculative arguments, pre-enforcement 
challenges would become incredibly difficult for plaintiffs to win, and 
more individuals would have their rights unduly burdened before 
unconstitutional abortion restrictions could be enjoined.187 Post-
enforcement challenges would also become more difficult if plaintiffs 
were forced to demonstrate that they had taken every conceivable 
action in an attempt to comply with the challenged abortion restriction, 
regardless of how futile, difficult, expensive, or self-destructive. 
                                                                
181. Id. at 2317 (majority opinion). 
182. Id. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. at 2317–18. 
185. Id. at 2318. 
186. Id. 
187. Individuals forced to forgo or delay a desired abortion (as a result of an 
abortion restriction) experience irreversible harm. In addition, clinics that 
are forced to close because of abortion restrictions are unlikely to reopen 
their doors when the restrictions are struck down. See infra notes 203–
206 and accompanying text. 
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The Fifth Circuit’s majority opinion in June Medical Services v. 
Gee188 illustrates the difficulties created for plaintiffs when courts focus 
on theoretical possibilities rather than the circumstances on the ground. 
The district court struck down Louisiana’s admitting-privileges 
requirement—which, like the provision struck down in Whole Woman’s 
Health, required abortion providers to hold admitting privileges at a 
hospital within thirty miles—after finding that the requirement placed 
an undue burden on the right to abortion.189 The Fifth Circuit reversed 
the district court’s judgment after holding that the district court had 
plainly erred in finding that the majority of abortion providers in 
Louisiana were unable to obtain admitting privileges despite their good-
faith efforts.190 The majority pointed out all of the possible actions that 
it believed the providers could and should have taken in an effort to 
obtain privileges, and it determined that because the providers did not 
take all of those actions, they had not put forth a good-faith effort to 
comply with the regulation.191 Based on this finding, the majority held 
that the plaintiffs had “failed to establish a causal connection between 
the regulation and its burden—namely, doctors’ inability to obtain 
admitting privileges.”192 The dissenting judge admonished the majority 
for failing to give appropriate deference to the district court’s findings 
and for failing to follow Whole Woman’s Health.193 One example of the 
majority’s flawed analyses is its conclusion that one of the abortion 
providers had not put forth a good-faith effort because he made no 
attempt to obtain privileges from two hospitals located within thirty 
miles of the clinic where he worked, and these hospitals continued to 
be “open options” for the provider.194 The dissent noted evidence in the 
record that one of the two hospitals “requires applicants to be able to 
admit fifty patients annually (something [the provider] c[ould not] do),” 
as well as evidence that a different provider applied for privileges at 
both hospitals but “was unable to obtain privileges from either.”195 The 
provider had applied at three other hospitals but was unable to obtain 
                                                                
188. 905 F.3d 787 (5th Cir. 2018). 
189. June Med. Servs. LLC v. Kliebert, 250 F. Supp. 3d 27, 88–89 (M.D. La. 
2017), rev’d sub nom. June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Gee, 905 F.3d 787 (5th 
Cir. 2018). 
190. June Med. Servs., 905 F.3d at 807, 810, 815. The Supreme Court stayed 
the Fifth Circuit’s mandate pending the outcome of the plaintiffs’ petition 
for a writ of certiorari. June Med. Servs., L.L.C. v. Gee, 139 S. Ct. 663 
(2019). 
191. June Med. Servs., 905 F.3d at 808–10.  
192. Id. at 807. 
193. Id. at 816 (Higgenbotham, J., dissenting). 
194. Id. at 808 (majority opinion). 
195. Id. at 829 n.40 (Higgenbotham, J., dissenting). 
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privileges that satisfied the regulatory requirements.196 Clearly, the 
majority’s conclusion relies on possibilities that are entirely improbable 
based on facts in the record and is inconsistent with the Court’s 
pragmatic burden analysis in Whole Woman’s Health.197 Furthermore, 
the majority opinion would seemingly require abortion providers to 
submit futile applications for privileges before they can legally establish 
the burden imposed by admitting-privileges requirements, even if they 
do not meet the explicit eligibility requirements set by the hospital. 
Some providers may be unwilling to accrue a record of unsuccessful 
privilege applications, which can adversely affect their professional 
reputation and their ability to secure hospital privileges in the future.198 
B. Applicability of Whole Woman’s Health’s Burden Analysis to Future 
Abortion Challenges 
 While the pragmatic aspects of the majority’s burden analysis seem 
to have a wide range of potential applications, the unique factual 
circumstances surrounding the challenged abortion restrictions in Texas 
and the majority’s narrow focus on the facts of this case may limit the 
decision’s utility in cases with less dramatic or otherwise different fact 
patterns. 
1. The “Benefit” of Hindsight 
The Whole Woman’s Health plaintiffs filed suit after the admitting-
privileges requirement had already gone into effect and half of the 
abortion clinics in Texas had been forced to close.199 Public health 
researchers studied the impact of these closures on abortion access and 
the provision of abortion services at the remaining clinics.200 
Accordingly, the plaintiffs were able to present empirical evidence to 
the court measuring the actual burdens imposed by one of the abortion 
restrictions they were challenging. Access to this data proved helpful. 
In support of its conclusion that the abortion clinics “that were still 
                                                                
196. Id. at 821–22. 
197. The dissenting judge clearly articulated the majority’s unreasonable 
departure from Whole Woman’s Health:  
The majority . . . essentially holds that, because private actors 
(the physicians) have not tried hard enough to mitigate the effects 
of the act (a conclusion contradicted by the district court’s factual 
findings), those effects are not fairly attributable to the act. That 
position finds no support in [Whole Woman’s Health]. 
  Id. at 830 (Higgenbotham, J., dissenting). 
198. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Strange, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1330, 
1347 (M.D. Ala. 2014). 
199. Daniel Grossman, The Use of Public Health Evidence in Whole Woman’s 
Health v. Hellerstedt, 177 JAMA Internal Med. 155, 155 (2017); 
Peterson, supra note 2. 
200. Grossman, supra note 199. 
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operating after the effective date of the admitting-privileges provision 
were not able to accommodate increased demand,” the Whole Woman’s 
Health majority cited evidence, gathered by public health researchers, 
of “3-week wait times, staff burnout” and severely overcrowded waiting 
rooms.201 This evidence also provided much of the foundation for the 
Court’s common-sense inference that if the ASC requirement went into 
effect, once again causing the number of Texas abortion clinics to 
decrease by more than half, the remaining clinics would not be capable 
of meeting the need for abortion services in Texas.202 
In some circumstances, it can be difficult to predict the full impact 
that abortion restrictions will have on abortion access before they take 
effect. Researchers who “evaluate[d] the impact of HB 2” found that “it 
was critical to document the changes in abortion service delivery after 
it went into effect.”203 However, while damage is easier to measure 
empirically once it has occurred, it is not always easy to reverse. Two 
years after Whole Woman’s Health was decided, only three of the 
nineteen clinics forced to close by HB 2’s requirements had reopened.204 
Many of the shuttered clinics will never reopen, and those that do will 
face an uphill battle. An article published in the Texas Tribune on the 
day Whole Woman’s Health was decided described some of the barriers 
preventing clinics from reopening: 
In the three years since Gov. Rick Perry signed HB 2, many of 
the shuttered clinics have sold their buildings or let go of their 
leases. Some had to surrender their abortion facility licenses to 
the state and will need to apply for a new one. They will also 
need to rehire staff and raise funds to acquire new medicine and 
equipment.205 
As a result of stigma, public relations concerns, and personal 
opposition to abortion, clinics have also had a difficult time hiring 
                                                                
201. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2318 (2016) (citing 
Brief for National Abortion Federation and Abortion Providers as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 17–20, Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. 
Ct. 2292 (No. 15–264)). 
202. See id. at 2317–18. 
203. Grossman, supra note 199, at 155. 
204. Claire Landsbaum, Here’s Why Texas Abortion Clinics Are Still 
Struggling to Reopen, The Cut (June 27, 2017, 4:07 PM), https://www. 
thecut.com/2017/06/texas-abortion-clinics-struggling-to-reopen-whole-
womans-health-vs-hellerstedt-anniversary.html [https://perma.cc/V8DL-
XN3Y]; supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
205. See Aneri Pattani, Don’t Expect Shuttered Texas Abortion Clinics to 
Reopen Soon, Tex. Trib. (June 27, 2016, 1:00 PM), https://www. 
texastribune.org/2016/06/27/dont-expect-shuttered-abortion-clinics-reopen-
soon/ [https://perma.cc/S8EH-SZPG]. 
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contractors and finding vendors willing to sell them furniture and 
equipment.206 
However, while the Court’s capacity analysis did cite evidence 
gathered after the admitting-privileges requirement went into effect, 
this type of post-enforcement evidence should not be required of all 
plaintiffs challenging abortion restrictions. Public health studies 
demonstrating the impact of clinic closures in other states, considered 
together with case-specific facts, should prove sufficient to infer lack of 
capacity. Whole Woman’s Health supports this conclusion, as it 
referenced a number of studies and expert opinions in its analysis that 
were not specific to Texas.207 Furthermore, when analyzing the burden 
that would be imposed by the ASC requirement if it was allowed to go 
into effect, the Court’s capacity analysis also relied on “common 
sense.”208 The majority found it reasonable to infer that “a physical 
facility that satisfies a certain physical demand will not be able to meet 
five times that demand without expanding or otherwise incurring 
significant costs.”209 This type of analysis should be possible to perform 
prior to the enforcement of other restrictions, provided that information 
is available about the average number of abortions currently performed 
per provider or clinic and about the anticipated number of clinics or 
providers that would remain if the restriction went into effect. 
2. Dramatic Fact Patterns 
As the saying goes, “everything is bigger in Texas.” The public 
health data cited by the Court pertaining to travel distance and 
demand for abortion care was extremely dramatic, due in part to factors 
including: the geographical size of Texas,210 the size of Texas’s 
population,211 the geographical distribution of Texas’s remaining clinics, 
                                                                
206. See Landsbaum, supra note 204. 
207. See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2312 
(2016) (discussing evidence of common prerequisites to obtaining 
admitting privileges at a hospital). The Supreme Court has condoned the 
use of “outside” studies in other contexts as well. See, e.g., City of Renton 
v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51–52 (1986) (allowing the city 
to rely on studies regarding the effects of adult theaters in other residential 
neighborhoods). 
208. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2317. 
209. Id. 
210. Texas is the second largest state in the United States, as measured by 
total area. State Area Measurements and Internal Point Coordinates, 
U.S. Census Bureau, https://www.census.gov/geo/reference/state-
area.html#n1 [https://perma.cc/25ZE-GMNQ] (last revised Dec. 5, 
2012). 
211. Texas is the second most populous state in the United States. Idaho Is 
Nation’s Fastest-Growing State, Census Bureau Reports, U.S. Census 
Bureau (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-
releases/2017/estimates-idaho.html [https://perma.cc/8WS3-84H9]. 
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and the geographic distribution of Texas’ poor and rural residents. 
Given these hard-to-replicate numbers and circumstances, courts may 
uphold similar abortion restrictions by distinguishing the facts of 
subsequent challenges that present less shocking data.212 
Furthermore, the impact of the challenged H.B. 2 provisions was 
both severe and sudden; the admitting-privileges requirement cut the 
number of Texas clinics nearly in half over a very short period of time, 
and the ASC requirement was expected to do the same.213 In other 
states, however, clinic closures have occurred more gradually, as the 
result of a number of different restrictions enacted over time.214 The end 
result may be the same, but successfully challenging abortion 
restrictions that only shut down one or two clinics at a time may prove 
to be more difficult than challenging restrictions that cause dramatic 
closures. The capacity analysis applied in Whole Woman’s Health seems 
to lend itself better to the latter than the former. Evidence presented 
by the plaintiffs in Whole Woman’s Health demonstrated that, should 
the ASC requirement have been enforced, the remaining clinics would 
have been required to perform five times as many abortions to meet the 
statewide need.215 The majority determined that, as a matter of common 
sense, the remaining facilities were likely incapable of increasing their 
services to this degree.216 Courts may decline to make similar inferences 
about capacity when remaining clinics have to adjust for a less dramatic 
decrease in clinics or providers.  
The dramatic fact pattern in Whole Woman’s Health may also limit 
the decision’s utility when an abortion restriction creates an ongoing 
risk of clinic closures that does not manifest all at once. For example, 
admitting-privileges requirements, like the one struck down in Whole 
Woman’s Health, place clinics in a precarious position, even when their 
providers are initially able to secure compliant privileges. This is 
because abortion providers face an ongoing risk of losing their privileges 
due to circumstances unrelated to their competence as medical 
                                                                
212. See, e.g., June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Gee, 905 F.3d 787, 791, 815 (5th Cir. 
2018) (holding that Louisiana’s admitting privileges requirement, similar 
to the provision struck down in Whole Woman’s Health, did not impose 
an undue burden, and contrasting the facts with those in Whole Woman’s 
Health, finding the “impact . . . in Louisiana [dramatically less] than in 
Texas”). 
213. See supra notes 9, 11. 
214. See, e.g., Supreme Court Hears Dispute on Abortion Clinic Closure, AP 
News (Sept. 12, 2017), https://apnews.com/2fc5de23be2e44e284b4befdd 
1a19a7a [https://perma.cc/5S7M-4FCN] (“Restrictions on abortion 
clinics in Ohio passed by lawmakers over the last six years have 
contributed to the closings of several clinics already. The state has 8 
clinics left operating. It had twice that many in 2011.”). 
215. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2316. 
216. Id. at 2317–18. 
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professionals. For example, the purchase of the only local hospital by a 
Catholic hospital system217 or pressure from anti-abortion activists 
could cause an abortion provider to lose their admitting privileges.218 
Finding another hospital willing to grant privileges is often difficult or 
impossible.219 Accordingly, this type of requirement may cause more 
gradual clinic closures in some states than it did in Texas, creating 
potential challenges for plaintiffs trying to establish the burden imposed 
by the requirement. 
3. Decreasing Access vs. Impeding the Expansion of Access 
Whole Woman’s Health analyzed two requirements that “re-
strict[ed] access to previously available legal [abortion] facilities.”220 
Because this case—as well as the majority of abortion jurisprudence—
analyzes burden through the lens of decreases in abortion access from 
the status quo, it is hard to tell how courts will measure the burden 
imposed by abortion restrictions that impede the expansion of abortion 
access. 
Telemedicine-abortion bans are a prime example of restrictions that 
impede the expansion of abortion access. Technological advances have 
led to a massive growth in telemedicine, or “the remote delivery of 
healthcare services, such as health assessments or consultations, over 
the telecommunications infrastructure.”221 Seeing an opportunity to 
                                                                
217. See Debra Stulberg & Lori Freedman, How Catholic Hospitals Restrict 
Reproductive Health Services, Scholar Strategy Network (May 30, 
2016), http://www.scholarsstrategynetwork.org/brief/how-catholic-hospitals 
-restrict-reproductive-health-services [https://perma.cc/BJ2E-BXKV] 
(discussing the expansion of Catholic hospitals and systems, and the 
directives that, “[a]s a condition of employment or medical privileges, 
doctors, nurses, and other clinical personnel are required to follow”) 
(emphasis added). 
218. See Feminist Newswire, Texas Hospitals Revoke Admitting Privileges to 
Abortion Providers, Feminist Majority Found. (Apr. 18, 2014, 11:30 
AM), https://feminist.org/blog/index.php/2014/04/18/texas-hospitals-
revoke-admitting-privileges-to-abortion-providers/ [https://perma.cc/J23F- 
WDRY] (reporting that “[t]hree Texas abortion providers this week had 
their hospital admitting privileges revoked at nearby hospitals after 
abortion opponents threatened the hospitals with negative publicity,” 
more than five months after H.B. 2’s admitting privileges requirement 
went into effect). 
219. See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2312–13 (describing 
“common prerequisites to obtaining admitting privileges,” such as 
minimum annual admissions requirements that are impossible for most 
abortion providers to meet due to the safety of the procedure).  
220. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2303 (quoting Whole Woman’s 
Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 687–88 (W.D. Tex. 2014)). 
221. Margaret Rouse, Telemedicine, SearchHealthIT, http://searchhealthit. 
techtarget.com/definition/telemedicine [https://perma.cc/P2G9-3DZR] 
(last visited Jan. 23, 2019). 
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reach women who do not live near an abortion clinic, abortion providers 
in a handful of states have started using telemedicine to provide 
medication abortions.222 In response, many states have passed pre-
emptive bans. As of March 2019, “17 states require that the clinician 
providing a medication abortion be physically present during the 
procedure, thereby prohibiting the use of telemedicine to prescribe 
medication for abortion remotely.”223 
Although telemedicine-abortion bans purport to protect women’s 
health, peer-reviewed studies show that medication abortions are just 
as safe when provided through telemedicine as when provided in 
person.224 Furthermore, many of the states that have enacted these bans 
do not prohibit other forms of telemedicine.225 Based on this evidence, 
states should have a difficult time showing that the bans further their 
interest in protecting women’s health. The more pressing question is 
whether courts will find that these bans impose a burden and, if so, 
what kind of evidence is required to support such a finding.226 Would 
                                                                
222. Medication Abortion, Guttmacher Inst., https://www.guttmacher.org/ 
state-policy/explore/medication-abortion [https://perma.cc/8WRH-G8A7] 
(last updated Mar. 1, 2019); Angie Leventis Lourgos, Illinois Clinic 
Provides Abortions via Telemedicine, Which Provides Wider Access but 
Is Prohibited in 19 States, Chi. Trib. (Jan. 19, 2018, 5:00 A.M.), https:// 
www.chicagotribune.com/lifestyles/health/ct-met-telemedicine-abortion-
illinois-20171220-story.html [https://perma.cc/UR8R-HJFQ] (describing 
telemedicine abortion in Illinois); Eric Wicklund, Abortion-by-
Telemedicine Pilot Launches in 4 States, mHealth Intelligence (Apr. 
1, 2016), https://mhealthintelligence.com/news/abortion-by-telemedicine-
pilot-launches-in-4-states [https://perma.cc/C76U-L3ZN] (discussing 
telemedicine abortion in Iowa and a pilot program launched in Hawaii, 
Oregon, New York, and Washington). 
223. Medication Abortion, supra note 222. 
224. Daniel Grossman & Kate Grindlay, Safety of Medical Abortion Provided 
Through Telemedicine Compared with in Person, 130 Obstetrics & 
Gynecology 778, 778–80 (2017); Abigail R. A. Aiken et al., Self Reported 
Outcomes and Adverse Events After Medical Abortion Through Online 
Telemedicine: Population Based Study in the Republic of Ireland and 
Northern Ireland, 357 BMJ 1 (2017). 
225. See, e.g., Latoya Thomas & Gary Capistrant, Am. Telemedicine 
Ass’n, State Telemedicine Gaps Analysis: Physician Practice 
Standards & Licensure 69–74 (2017). 
226. In Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc. v. Iowa Board of Medicine, 
865 N.W.2d 252 (Iowa 2015), the Supreme Court of Iowa held that the 
state’s telemedicine abortion ban “places an undue burden on a woman’s 
right to terminate her pregnancy as defined by the United States Supreme 
Court in its federal constitutional precedents.” Id. at 269. Based on the 
record evidence, the court found that the telemedicine ban had “very 
limited health benefits” and “would make it more challenging for many 
women who wish to exercise their constitutional right to terminate a 
pregnancy in Iowa to do so.” Id. at 268. However, the clinic challenging 
the ban was one of the first to provide telemedicine abortions in the 
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evidence of the number of clinics that would begin providing 
telemedicine abortions if the ban is lifted be sufficient? If not, would 
the plaintiffs need to provide evidence that women in remote regions of 
the state currently face obstacles to accessing abortion care or that the 
existing clinics are not capable of meeting the statewide demand? Under 
these circumstances, it would be very difficult to measure the number 
of women who are unduly burdened by the status quo. Plaintiffs would 
likely have to rely on travel-distance data, supplemented with empirical 
studies measuring the impact of travel distance on abortion rates.227  
IV. Remaining Questions Regarding the Correct 
Application of the Undue-Burden Standard 
A. Balancing Benefits and Burdens 
While the majority made clear that the undue-burden test requires 
courts to weigh the actual benefits of an abortion regulation against the 
burdens it imposes, the opinion left some remaining questions about 
how the test should be applied. After the decision, courts have disagreed 
about whether Whole Woman’s Health called for a true balancing test, 
or whether the burdens imposed by a challenged abortion regulation 
must reach some quantitative or qualitative threshold before the 
balancing even becomes necessary. The majority opinion was not 
entirely clear regarding how the weighing of benefits and burdens 
should be reconciled with Casey’s heavy reliance on the ambiguous 
phrase “substantial obstacle” in an attempt to clarify the meaning of 
“undue burden.”228 Some courts have interpreted the Whole Woman’s 
Health opinion to mean that the burdens imposed by an abortion 
regulation amount to a substantial obstacle, and are thus undue, if they 
outweigh the benefits of the regulation.229 Others, however, continue to 
read the test as requiring a finding that the burden has reached the 
level of a substantial obstacle, independent of the outcome of any 
balancing. 
                                                                
United States, and clinics across Iowa were already providing this service 
when the state legislature instituted the ban. See Lourgos, supra note 222. 
227. See, e.g., Jason Lindo et al., How Far is Too Far?: New Evidence on 
Abortion Clinic Closures, Access, and Abortions, J. Human Resources 
(2019). 
228. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) 
(explaining that “[a] finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the 
conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a 
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a 
nonviable fetus”) (emphasis added). 
229. Whole Woman’s Health v. Paxton, 264 F. Supp. 3d 813, 821 (W.D. Tex. 
2017) (“Where a law’s burdens exceed its benefits, those burdens are, by 
definition, undue, and the obstacles they embody are, by definition, 
substantial.”). 
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A circuit split on this issue is forming along familiar lines. The 
Seventh Circuit applied a true balancing test before Whole Woman’s 
Health was decided and has stayed true to this interpretation in more 
recent decisions. Under this interpretation, even minor burdens can 
justify the invalidation of certain abortion restrictions: “[t]he more 
feeble the state’s asserted interest, ‘the likelier the burden, even if slight, 
to be “undue” in the sense of disproportionate or gratuitous.’”230 In 
direct contrast, the Fifth Circuit opined in Gee that the standard 
articulated in Whole Woman’s Health is not “a ‘pure’ balancing test 
under which any burden, no matter how slight, invalidates the law.”231 
The majority went on to explain that a regulation can only be 
unconstitutional if its burdens amount to a substantial obstacle, 
regardless of how minimal its benefits are.232 This articulation is 
conspicuously reminiscent of the Fifth Circuit’s prior articulation of the 
undue burden test, which the Supreme Court summarily rejected in 
Whole Woman’s Health.233 The dissenting judge on the Fifth Circuit 
panel criticized the majority for not heeding the Court’s recent 
admonitions, “failing to meaningfully balance the burdens and 
benefits . . . and leav[ing] the undue burden test devoid of meaning.”234 
Requiring the burden to reach the ambiguous threshold 
requirement of constituting a “substantial obstacle” before weighing it 
against the benefits would seemingly provide even lesser protections to 
the constitutional right than the Fifth Circuit’s formulation of the test 
in Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole. After all, under the Fifth Circuit’s 
interpretation, once the burden reached the point of being a substantial 
obstacle to abortion access, the burden became undue and the law 
unconstitutional.235 Considering that the Supreme Court adamantly 
rejected this interpretation of the test in Whole Woman’s Health v. 
Hellerstedt and admonished the Fifth Circuit for not weighing the 
                                                                
230. Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r of Ind. State Dep’t of 
Health, 896 F.3d 809, 828 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Planned Parenthood 
of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 738 F.3d 786, 798 (7th Cir. 2013)). 
231. June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Gee, 905 F.3d 787, 803 (5th Cir. 2018). 
232. Id. (claiming that “even regulations with a minimal benefit are 
unconstitutional only where they present a substantial obstacle to 
abortion”). 
233. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309 (2016) 
(citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887–98 
(1992)). 
234. June Med. Servs., 905 F.3d at 831 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). 
235. Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563, 572 (5th Cir. 2015), rev’d 
and remanded sub nom. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 
2292 (2016). 
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benefits and burdens,236 it would make little sense to read a threshold 
requirement into the Court’s articulation of the balancing test. 
B. Large-Fraction Test 
Although the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s facial 
invalidation of the ASC requirement after finding that the plaintiffs 
had not demonstrated that the requirement unduly burdened a large 
fraction of women,237 the Whole Woman’s Health majority waited until 
the end of the opinion to address this issue. The majority denounced 
Texas’s articulation of the “denominator” as “Texan women ‘of 
reproductive age,’” explaining that “the relevant denominator is ‘those 
[women] for whom [the provision] is an actual rather than an irrelevant 
restriction.’”238 The opinion’s discussion of the large-fraction test began 
and ended with this brief rebuke; the majority made no attempt to plug 
any numbers into the equation to justify facially invalidating the Texas 
abortion requirements. Nor did the Court defer to any explicit 
numerical calculations made by the district court, as the district court 
engaged in no such analysis. Indeed, it seemed as if the majority 
rejected the need for confusing and ambiguous numerical calculations 
entirely when it held that the challenged abortion restrictions were 
facially unconstitutional without engaging in any such analysis, thus 
putting this confusing test to rest. 
Although even the dissent in Whole Woman’s Health interpreted 
the majority opinion as rendering the large-fraction test obsolete,239 a 
number of lower courts have taken a very different message from the 
decision. Some courts have justified their continuing application of the 
large-fraction test by citing the Court’s “limited discussion” of the 
matter in Whole Woman’s Health.240 In Gee, the Fifth Circuit asserted 
                                                                
236. See Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309–10 
(2016). 
237. Cole, 790 F.3d at 588–89.  
238. Id. at 2320 (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 895). 
239. Id. at 2343 n.11 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Under the Court’s holding, we 
are supposed to use the same figure (women actually burdened) as both 
the numerator and the denominator. By my math, that fraction is always 
“1,” which is pretty large as fractions go.”). In Whole Woman’s Health v. 
Cole, the Fifth Circuit made the same argument, claiming that this 
approach, which was set forth by the plaintiffs on appeal, would “make 
the large fraction test merely a tautology, always resulting in a large 
fraction.” 790 F.3d at 589 (quoting Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 769 
F.3d 285, 299 (5th Cir. 2014), vacated in part, 135 S. Ct. 399 (2014)). 
Justice Alito also criticized the majority’s failure to acknowledge that the 
correct standard for facial challenges to abortion regulations was an “open 
question.” Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2343 n.11 (Alito, J., 
dissenting). 
240. See, e.g., Jackson Women’s Health Org. v. Currier, 320 F. Supp. 3d 828, 
841 (S.D. Miss. 2018) (“Had the Hellerstedt Court wished to make that 
dramatic departure, it could have simply said there is no longer a 
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that the Whole Woman’s Health decision unambiguously adopted the 
large-fraction test as the correct standard for facial challenges to 
abortion restrictions, yet the majority opinion failed to clearly explain 
“how to delimit the numerator and denominator to define the relevant 
fraction,” thus leaving room for interpretation.241 The Fifth Circuit 
proceeded to engage in the same type of numerical calculations that the 
court had performed in the opinion overturned by Whole Woman’s 
Health, using slightly more narrow populations as denominators so as 
to “comply” with the Supreme Court’s directions.242 As the sole 
dissenting judge pointed out, these types of “elaborate ‘mathematical’ 
calculations” are not required by Supreme Court precedent, as 
“[n]either Casey nor [Whole Woman’s Health] calculated a numerical 
fraction of women who would be burdened before invalidating statutory 
provisions.”243 
In Planned Parenthood of Arkansas & Eastern Oklahoma v. 
Jegley,244 the Eighth Circuit also focused solely on the Whole Woman’s 
Health’s articulation of the correct denominator, ignoring the fact that 
the Court had facially invalidated the Texas regulations without 
making numerical calculations. The Eighth Circuit vacated a district 
court’s preliminary injunction of an Arkansas law targeting medication 
abortion providers,245 holding that the district court had failed to 
appropriately apply the large-fraction test.246 According to the Eighth 
Circuit, the district court correctly defined the denominator, but 
mistakenly “focused on amorphous groups of women to reach its 
conclusion that the Act was facially unconstitutional.”247 The circuit 
court remanded the case, directing the district court to first make 
concrete estimations of the number of women who would forgo or 
                                                                
distinction between as-applied and facial attacks in the abortion context. 
But its limited discussion of the issue never says that.”). 
241. June Med. Services L.L.C. v. Gee, 905 F.3d 787, 802, 813 (5th Cir. 2018). 
242. Id. at 813–15. 
243. Id. at 832 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). 
244. 864 F.3d 953 (8th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 2573 (2018). 
245. The challenged law requires medication-abortion providers to contract 
with a physician who has “active admitting privileges and 
gynecological/surgical privileges at a hospital designated to handle any 
emergencies associated with the use or ingestion of the abortion-inducing 
drug.” Planned Parenthood Ark. & E. Okla. v. Jegley (Jegley I), No. 4:15-
CV-00784-KGB, 2016 WL 6211310, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 14, 
2016), vacated and remanded Planned Parenthood of Ark. & E. Okla. v. 
Jegley (Jegley II), 864 F.3d 953 (8th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 
2573 (2018) (quoting Ark. Code Ann. § 20-16-1504(d)). It also requires 
providers to give medication-abortion patients the name and phone 
number of the contracted physician and the hospital. Id.  
246. Jegley II, 864 F.3d at 960–61. 
247. Id. at 959. 
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postpone a desired abortion because of the challenged regulation, and 
then to determine “whether they constitute a ‘large fraction’ of women 
seeking medication abortions in Arkansas.”248 The Court in Whole 
Woman’s Health required no such calculations. 
These decisions out of the Fifth and Eighth Circuits may claim to 
adhere to the Supreme Court’s decision in Whole Woman’s Health, but 
their application of the large-fraction test and balancing test contradict 
both the word and the spirit of the majority opinion. It is not evident 
that these courts would have ruled any differently if Justice Breyer’s 
opinion had been devoid of any ambiguities regarding the correct 
application of both tests. Perhaps these courts are attempting to narrow 
the precedent set by Whole Woman’s Health by taking advantage of its 
ambiguities, but the extent to which these decisions depart from a 
logical interpretation of the decision suggests that the courts may be 
hoping that a shift in the makeup of the Supreme Court will lead to a 
different outcome on appeal.249 
C. Fetal-Protective Restrictions 
In Whole Woman’s Health, the Supreme Court assumed that 
Texas’s interest in enacting the challenged H.B. 2 provisions was 
protecting women’s health.250 Accordingly, while the majority opinion 
provided a useful roadmap for analyzing and balancing the benefits and 
burdens of woman-protective restrictions, the decision raised some 
questions regarding the test’s applicability to fetal-protective 
restrictions. To be clear, the Court’s description of the undue-burden 
balancing test was not specific to woman-protective restrictions.251 In 
fact, the Court supported its articulation of this test by citing Casey’s 
application of a balancing test to a spousal-notification requirement and 
a parental-notification requirement, neither of which were justified as 
health protections.252 Regardless, states are now arguing that fetal-
protective legislation should not be decided under the balancing test 
                                                                
248. Id. at 959–60. 
249. For a general discussion of lower court decisions that narrow Supreme 
Court precedent, see Richard M. Re, Legal Scholarship Highlight: When 
Lower Courts Don’t Follow Supreme Court Precedent, SCOTUSblog (Oct. 
18, 2016, 10:02 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/10/legal-scholarship-
highlight-when-lower-courts-dont-follow-supreme-court-precedent/ [https:// 
perma.cc/L225-RF9Y].  
250. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2310 (2016). 
251. Id. at 2309 (“The rule announced in Casey, however, requires that courts 
consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with the 
benefits those laws confer.”). 
252. Id. (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887–901 
(1992)). 
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articulated in Whole Woman’s Health.253 Courts have rejected this 
argument, either explicitly or implicitly by applying a similar balancing 
test to fetal-protective regulations.254 However, only a few courts have 
issued decisions pertaining to fetal-protective restrictions at this time, 
and at least one court that applied a balancing test to woman-protective 
abortion restrictions prior to Whole Woman’s Health believed that a 
different test applied to fetal-protective abortion restrictions.255 
Assuming that courts are expected to apply the same test, the 
question becomes, how. Some fetal-protective restrictions are justified 
by empirical assumptions or scientific claims, allowing for an easier 
analysis of whether the restrictions actually further a legitimate 
purpose.256 However, the benefits of other fetal-protective restrictions 
may be much more difficult to measure. For example, courts may 
struggle to measure the actual benefits of laws purporting to promote 
respect for fetal life. Despite these potential difficulties, courts must 
critically scrutinize how well a challenged abortion restriction actually 
                                                                
253. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc. v. Comm’r of Ind. State 
Dep’t of Health, 896 F.3d 809, 817–18 (7th Cir. 2018) (rejecting Indiana’s 
argument “that the test for weighing abortion regulations differs 
depending on the purpose of the statute and that Casey and Whole 
Women’s Health [sic] establish different tests depending on the nature of 
the regulation”); Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 231 F. Supp. 3d 
218, 228 (W.D. Tex. 2017) (“According to [the Texas Department of State 
Health Services], the Court should not balance the benefits and burdens 
of regulations expressing respect for the life of the unborn. The Court 
disagrees.”); Whole Woman’s Health v. Paxton, 264 F. Supp. 3d 813, 820–
21 (W.D. Tex. 2017). 
254. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky., Inc., 896 F.3d at 817 
(explicitly rejecting Indiana’s argument that Whole Woman’s Health’s 
balancing test did not apply to the state’s challenged ultrasound waiting 
period requirement because it was a fetal-protective law); Whole Woman’s 
Health v. Hellerstedt, 231 F. Supp. 3d at 228 (“[Texas’s] argument [that] 
a different test applies when the State expresses respect for the life of the 
unborn is a work of fiction, completely unsupported by reading the 
sections of Supreme Court opinions DSHS cites in context.”); Whole 
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, No. A-16-CA-1300, slip op. at 10–13 
(W.D. Tex. Jan. 29, 2018) (balancing the benefits and burdens of Texas’s 
fetal disposition requirements). 
255. See Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc. v. Iowa Bd. of Med., 865 
N.W.2d 252, 263 (Iowa 2015) (“The Court applies the undue burden test 
differently depending on the state’s interest advanced by a statute or 
regulation.”). 
256. When considering challenges to laws based on fetal pain, for example, 
courts can analyze the reliability of the evidence presented by both sides, 
which would likely include scientific studies and testimony. 
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advances this type of fetal-protective interest257—a task the Supreme 
Court has previously been unwilling to take on.258 
Weighing a challenged restriction’s fetal-protective benefits against 
the burdens it places on the right to abortion poses additional 
challenges. When analyzing woman-protective restrictions, the benefits 
and burdens are often, but not always, “measured by the same unit—
women’s health.”259 This is not the case for fetal-protective restrictions. 
Furthermore, the application of a legal balancing test necessarily 
requires judges to “combin[e] value judgments and empirical judgments 
on one scale, and weigh[] them against similar judgments on the other 
scales.”260 In practice, balancing tests “allow[] [judges] maximum 
flexibility with minimum accountability.”261 While these issues also arise 
when judges balance the benefits and burdens of woman-protective 
abortion restrictions, asking judges to weigh a restriction’s fetal-
protective benefits against the burdens it imposes on the abortion 
decision seemingly invites personal values and bias into the analysis on 
a much greater scale. Judicial decision makers who identify with a 
government defendant’s preference for childbirth over abortion may 
weigh the benefits prong more heavily than those who value respect for 
women’s reproductive choices. 
D. Impermissible Purpose 
Since the Supreme Court first articulated the undue-burden 
standard in Casey, the Court has never invalidated an abortion 
restriction based on impermissible purpose. In Whole Woman’s Health 
v. Cole,262 the Fifth Circuit overturned the district court’s 
determination that Texas enacted the ASC requirements for the 
purpose of placing a substantial obstacle in the way of women’s right 
to abortion.263 The majority opinion in Whole Woman’s Health v. 
                                                                
257. See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Smith, 338 F. Supp. 3d 606, 627–28 
(W.D. Tex. 2018) (analyzing benefits of Texas law governing the 
disposition of fetal tissue with claimed purpose of expressing respect for 
potential human life). 
258. In Gonzales, Justice Kennedy rejected the challengers’ argument that 
banning D&X but not the standard D&E procedure did not actually 
further any interest in promoting respect for fetal life because D&E can 
be “as brutal, if not more, than [D&X].” Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 
124, 160 (2007). But see id. at 181–82 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(distinguishing D&X from D&E). 
259. Leah M. Litman, Response, Potential Life in the Doctrine, 95 Tex. L. 
Rev. 204, 207 (2017). 
260. Faigman, supra note 144, at 586. 
261. Id. 
262. 790 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 2015), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Whole 
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). 
263. Id. at 584–86. 
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Hellerstedt provides no direct insight into whether the district court’s 
holding on purpose was proper. 
The district court analyzed Texas’s purpose in enacting the 
challenged restrictions, despite noting that a finding of impermissible 
purpose was not necessary because the court had already determined 
that the challenged provisions had the effect of imposing an undue 
burden. The court “conclude[d], after examining the act and the context 
in which it operates, that the ambulatory-surgical-center requirement 
was intended to close existing licensed abortion clinics.”264 In support 
of this conclusion, the court cited the requirement’s disparate and 
arbitrary treatment of abortion clinics in comparison to other health 
care facilities with ASC requirements, which the court found 
particularly telling when considered against the lack of any credible 
evidence of health benefits.265 The court also pointed to Texas’s 
argument that women in certain areas of the state could easily travel 
across the border to a clinic in New Mexico, where abortion clinics do 
not have to meet similar surgical-center requirements. Accordingly, the 
court reasoned that Texas’s argument was “disingenuous and 
incompatible” with the state’s purported purpose of “protect[ing] the 
health and safety of Texas women who seek abortions” but was 
“perfectly congruent” if Texas’s “underlying purpose in enacting the 
requirement was to reduce or eliminate abortion in parts or all of 
Texas.”266 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit found the district court’s 
determination of purpose was made in error, claiming that the plaintiffs 
“failed to proffer competent evidence contradicting the legislature’s 
statement of a legitimate purpose for H.B. 2.”267 
The Supreme Court did not deal with this holding directly. In 
analyzing whether the ASC requirement actually provided any health-
related benefit, Justice Breyer discussed abortion clinics’ disparate 
treatment under the requirement, pointing to the district court’s finding 
that Texas grandfathers or waives the requirements in whole or part 
for approximately two-thirds of non-abortion-clinic facilities that are 
required by statute to comply but does not grandfather or waive 
                                                                
264. Whole Woman’s Health v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 685 (W.D. Tex. 
2014). 
265. Id. Specifically, the court noted that “[t[he requirement’s implementing 
rules specifically deny grandfathering or the granting of waivers to 
previously licensed abortion providers. This is in contrast to the ‘frequent’ 
granting of some sort of variance from the standards which occur in the 
licensing of nearly three-quarters of all licensed ambulatory surgical 
centers in Texas.” Id. 
266. Id. at 685–86. 
267. Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563, 585 (5th Cir. 2015), rev’d 
and remanded sub nom. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 
2292 (2016). 
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requirements for abortion clinics.268 The Court also pointed to evidence 
that Texas does not impose surgical-center requirements on comparable 
procedures with much greater mortality and complication rates.269 The 
Court went as far as declaring that this evidence “indicate[s] that the 
surgical center provision imposes ‘a requirement that simply is not 
based on differences’ between abortion and other surgical procedures 
‘that are reasonably related to’” Texas’s purported purpose of 
“preserving women’s health.”270 While the Court’s analysis seems to 
subtly imply that Texas did not enact this requirement with the goal 
of protecting women’s health, the Court does not explicitly discuss the 
purpose behind either of the challenged restrictions. 
The majority’s silence on this issue seems like a missed opportunity. 
While in this particular case the plaintiffs were able to provide plentiful 
evidence of the challenged restrictions’ effects, future plaintiffs 
challenging other abortion restrictions may not have access to such 
strong evidence of effect. They may, however, be able to demonstrate 
an impermissible purpose based on disparate treatment, legislative 
history, and other relevant evidence. Presumably, it is not necessary to 
apply the balancing test once such a purpose is found. While the 
majority opinion did not rule out future analyses of the government’s 
true purpose, its decision did not provide future plaintiffs with a strong 
precedent to use in support of such an argument. 
Conclusion 
Whole Woman’s Health was a monumental decision because it 
saved a woman’s right to have an abortion from becoming a right only 
in theory, but not in fact. Some commentators, however, have 
drastically overstated the decision’s ability to act as a shield against all 
future attacks on a woman’s reproductive autonomy. Justice Breyer’s 
articulation and application of the undue-burden balancing test 
strengthened this standard of review to an extent, but ambiguities in 
the decision left it vulnerable to manipulation.  
Notably, the decision has not deterred legislatures across the 
country from persistently passing new abortion restrictions. During 
2017, the year after Whole Woman’s Health was decided, “19 states 
adopt[ed] 63 new restrictions on abortion rights and access,” for the 
“largest [total] number of abortion restrictions enacted in a year since 
2013,” when Texas enacted H.B. 2.271 In addition to enacting regulations 
                                                                
268. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2315 (citing Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 
at 680–81). 
269. Id. 
270. Id. (quoting Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 194 (1973)). 
271. Elizabeth Nash et al., Policy Trends in the States, 2017, Guttmacher 
Inst. (Jan. 2, 2018), https://www.guttmacher.org/article/2018/01/ 
policy-trends-states-2017 [https://perma.cc/BJ86-DNDR]. 
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that gradually chip away at abortion’s constitutional protections, states 
have been increasingly passing blatantly unconstitutional abortion bans 
with the overt goal of overturning Roe v. Wade.272 The strength of the 
Whole Woman’s Health decision will be tested as challenges to these 
abortion restrictions make their way through the courts. Even if the 
current constitutional precedent remains intact, however, the 
ambiguities in the Whole Woman’s Health decision may allow courts to 
narrow its application and gut it of the protections it affords to abortion 
access without overturning the decision outright. 
Despite the Whole Woman’s Health’s weaknesses and its uncertain 
future, the decision’s articulation of the undue-burden standard is what 
reproductive rights advocates currently have to work with. A careful 
reading of the decision provides helpful guidance to potential plaintiffs 
regarding the types of evidence they should present in a challenge and 
ways to address anticipated defenses. The decision should also inspire 
continued research into the impacts of abortion restrictions that have 
gone into effect, the safety of technological advances in reproductive 
health, and other topics relevant to future litigation.  
 
 
Becca Kendis† 
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